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THE INTERNAL-EXTERNAL DICHOTOMY:
A Theoretical Approach to Foreign Policy Decision-making
ABSTRACT
In this study the author formulates and applys a 
decision-making model which attempts to uncover the role 
of justification in the policy process. When discussing 
the importance of justification in the policy process the 
author distinguishes between the "internal" and "exte­
rnal" realms. The internal realm is a theoretical 
category which describes social interactions within the 
highest levels of government (discussions within the 
N.S.C. and the cabinet). The external realm describes 
politics outside the inner circle; this involves the 
press, the public and an attentive international 
audience. The concerns of policy makers, and their 
explanations of policy, change depending on the realm in 
which they are justifying a given policy.
Chapter One outlines the theoretical framework of 
the model and reveiws some of the relevant literature in 
the field. Chapter Two focusses on the causes of diver­
gence between internal and external justifications and 
employs the decision to implement the Truman Doctrine in 
1947 as a case study. Chapter Three offers a more subtle 
application of the model and discusses qualitative types 
of divergence— the decision to commit combat troops in 
Vietnam serves as the second case study.
All the examples offered in the paper deal with 
American foreign policy decisions; however, the model is 
not limited to this avenue of analysis. As the author 
shows, this approach has far-reaching implications for 
international relations, definitions of political power 
and decision-making theory.
vi
THE INTERNAL-EXTERNAL DICHOTOMY:
Theoretical Approach to Foreign Policy Decision-making
2INTRODUCTION
When political leaders, advisors, and bureaucrats 
formulate a policy, they inevitably justify it or offer 
reasons why the state ought to pursue that policy rather 
than another. This process of justification takes place 
in at least two spheres of activity: the "internal” realm 
and the "external" realm. During the policy making 
process, reasons supporting a particular course of action 
are typically discussed and debated among upper level 
decision-makers behind closed doors. The reasons offered 
in such a forum to support a ratified action will be 
considered the "internal justification." The executive 
may justify and explain the policy to those beyond the 
inner circle of decision-makers using the same or dis­
similar arguments as those expressed in the internal 
justification. In any case, the justification offered to 
the public, press and the international community will be 
called the "external justification." This frequently 
overlooked distinction becomes important when the politi­
cal leader, analyst, or researcher tries to understand, 
predict, or explain- the actions of a state in interna­
tional relations.
3Often the executive will find it politically ex­
pedient to cultivate a divergence between the internal 
and external justifications for a policy. It is clear 
that for purposes of presentation, a government may find 
its interests best served when the external justification 
is different from the internal one. For example, country 
A may decide to bomb country B for the purpose of killing 
the leader of B. A may then find it beneficial to jus­
tify the policy to the press, the public, and the inter­
national community as retaliation for past attacks on the 
citizens and property of country A and for the purpose of 
deterring future attacks by B on A. Whether country B 
actually attacked A's citizens and property will affect 
the acceptability of the external justification; however, 
it does not alter the rationale for diverging from the 
internal justification. Policy-makers are aware that the 
internal justification may appear less acceptable to the 
domestic population or the international community than 
the external justification.
While there are a number of possible reasons for a 
government to maintain different internal and external 
justifications for a policy, this study will emphasize 
the perceived need of states to perpetuate a divergence 
because of an attentive international audience. States
4pursue their interests within an increasingly interdepen­
dent world where the actions of one state often affect 
the interests of another. For this reason allies and 
adversaries of any given state will be attuned to the 
actions and words of that state. Naturally, the most 
important and powerful nations have the greatest influ­
ence on a large number of other states. Therefore, the 
most powerful will be the most closely watched and thus 
have the greatest incentive to cultivate a certain im­
age,1 whether as steadfast ally, cooperative internation­
al trade partner, resolute adversary, or even irrational 
madman.2
Robert Jervis discusses the importance of percep­
tions in International Relations as they affect the 
ability of states to successfully pursue their objectives 
claiming, "Throughout history and especially for the 
great powers since 1945, states have often cared about 
specific issues less for their intrinsic value than for 
the conclusions they felt others would draw from the way 
they dealt with them." Robert Jervis, The Logic of 
Images in International Relations (Princeton, New Jersey: 
Princeton University Press, 1970), 7.
2While the United States has rarely played the part 
of irrational madman, the Eisenhower administration's 
espoused military doctrine which relied heavily on asym­
metrical responses to Soviet provocation could be viewed 
as such. An American nuclear strike in response to a 
limited conventional attack might be seen as irrational 
in the sense that the potential benefits of such a strike 
would be less than the likely costs. (i.e. war, or later 
even nuclear retaliation by the Soviet Union.) However, 
by giving the appearance of irrationality, it was hoped 
Moscow would be less willing to embark on military adven­
tures that threatened the interests of the West. Ob­
viously, the presentation of oneself as irrational madman
5This paper deals almost entirely with U.S. foreign 
policy decisions. The raw data on "internal justifica­
tions" was more fully documented and readily available in 
U.S. government documents and memoirs than in those of 
any other country, making the material well suited for 
this study. The topic is best covered not by using one 
or two full length case studies but a number of shorter 
ones from a variety of different administrations and 
issue areas. This method is preferred because it helps 
demonstrate the regularity of divergence conditioned by 
the international system and the structure of governmen­
tal institutions in the United States rather than the 
personal outlook or deceitful character of a few individ­
uals .3
By describing various foreign policy decisions in 
terms of the internal-external dichotomy one can hope to 
accomplish three things. First, and most obviously, one 
is offered a new perspective on the actual process of
may be completely rational. For a discussion of asym­
metry and "brinksmanship" see John Lewis Gaddis, Strat- 
egies of Containment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1982), 150-151.
3The study concentrates on what Waltz terms "second 
and third levels of analysis," of explanations of events 
focussing on the nature of the state and the internation­
al system respectively. See Kenneth N. Waltz, Man, the 
State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1959), esp. chpts 1-3.
6decision-making. By approaching foreign policy decision­
making in this way, one is forced to ask more probing 
questions about the forces and interests that drive this 
dynamic process. Second, the study has broader implica­
tions for international relations. A misunderstanding of 
power defined strictly in terms of military, economic, 
demographic and geographic assets has led many observers 
to inaccurate and inadequate explanations of events in 
international relations. This examination casts doubt on 
narrow definitions of power and shows that the perceived 
need of states to project a particular image in the world 
affects the decision-making process to a greater degree 
than is usually assumed. Third, in the process of study­
ing various cases the very theoretical framework being 
applied is tested, revised and polished. The author's 
most lofty hopes would be realized if this paper clari­
fied or extended useful theoretical approaches to inter­
national politics (or decision-making processes) so other 
research projects might benefit from such work in the 
future.
7CHAPTER I: JUSTIFICATION IN THE POLICY PROCESS 
The Internal/External Dichotomy
A justification is a reason or set of reasons of­
fered to an audience to show there are adequate grounds 
to support and pursue some action. A justification may 
or may not represent the actual cause of some action or 
policy. It merely has to offer a well-warranted reason 
for the action. For example, country A could do X for 
reason Y and then justify X for reason Z. The purpose of 
a justification is to make some action acceptable to a 
given audience. Naturally, as one's audience changes, 
the justification for the same action may have to change 
to ensure the action remains acceptable.
When the executive branch of the U.S. government 
adopts a particular policy, it usually presents the 
policy to the public and explains the policy's purpose.
It is in this realm of press conferences and public 
speeches that we find the "external justification," which 
many observers have otherwise called "the official line." 
Sometimes there is no immediate justification accompany­
ing the initiation of the policy— for example, when the 
action is covert— but in these cases an external jus­
tification usually emerges after the fact. The
"internal justification" is a reason or set of reasons 
offered within the executive branch behind closed doors—  
most often in the National Security Council (N.S.C.), 
National Security Planning Group (N.S.P.G.) or some 
similar forum. The internal justification is usually a 
more causally efficacious reason in explaining a policy 
than the external justification; however, as we will 
discuss in detail later, it would be a mistake to con­
sider the internal justification the a priori "real 
reason" for the adoption of some policy.1
Paul Anderson claims "the constraints imposed by 
justification and precedent do not depend upon public 
statements accurately portraying private beliefs." He 
accurately concludes there is "a socially defined dis­
tinction between legitimate and illegitimate justific­
atory arguments."2 While Anderson is discussing public 
statements by political leaders, there is no reason to
xThe framework focussing on and the distinction 
between internal and external justifications was first 
made by David Dessler in "Structural Origins of Major 
War," (Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 
1987). While our use of the terms is slightly modified, 
there is considerable overlap between Dessler's use of 
the terms and the manner in which they are used in this 
study.
2Paul Anderson, "Justifications and Precedents as 
Constraints in Foreign Policy Decision-Making," American 
Journal of Political Science (November 1981): 741, 745.
9think that justificatory statements supporting some 
recommendation within the inner realm are not subject to 
similar constraints. Therefore, one can expand the 
notion of "illegitimate and legitimate" arguments and 
claim: Policy-makers justify actions or recommendations
in a manner they believe will be acceptable to a given 
audience.
External Justification
Decision-makers and political leaders justify pol­
icies and potential policies through moral arguments, 
legal arguments, ideological arguments or in terms of the 
national interest.3 In the external realm, the legal, 
moral and ideological arguments are often emphasized to 
cultivate a certain image of the state or government
3It is rare that a policy-maker would ever justify 
some course of action in terms of his or her own personal 
interest since this would likely be an unacceptable type 
of justification to any audience that we are discussing 
here. Imagine a Vice President standing up in an N.S.C. 
meeting or at a press conference saying, "I advocate that 
U.S. foreign policy should support the anti-Sandinista 
forces in Nicaragua because I own stock in a company 
whose assets were frozen after the revolution." Even if 
that were the way he felt, he would be much more likely 
to argue that the policy should be adopted for reasons 
more palatable to his audience. This example demon­
strates t'he potential difference between what actually 
motivates action and the justification given for that 
action (whether in the internal or external realms). For 
more detailed discussion of this point see Anderson, 745.
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justifying its policy. The United States policy toward 
the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua has been justified for 
years in a manner that stresses the moral and ideological 
facets of American policy. In his televised address to 
the nation on May 9, 1984, President Reagan explained 
U.S. policy toward Central America and asked the American 
people and Congress to support administration policy 
there.4 He asserted the U.S. goal was "to promote demo­
cracy and economic well being" in the region. After 
briefly describing U.S. interests in the region in terms 
of trade, the Panama Canal, and the geographic proximity 
to the United States, Reagan embarked on an extended 
criticism of the "Sandinista reign of terror." The 
particular policies that the President was defending were 
economic and military aid for the democratic governments 
in the region and military assistance to the "freedom 
fighters" in Nicaragua. Reagan concluded, "The United 
States must continue to support both the elected Govern­
ment of El Salvador and the democratic aspirations of the 
Nicaraguan people." He went on to explain that the 
contras were the force representing the democratic aspir­
ations of the Nicaraguan people. The full force of the
4For a text of President Reagan's speech see "U.S. 
Interests in Central America," Department of State Bul­
letin, June 1984, 22-26.
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moral and ideological aspects of the external justifica­
tion surfaced as the President made a pointed pitch for 
public support of his policies.
If the Soviet Union can aid and abet subversion 
in our hemisphere, then the United States has a 
legal right and a moral duty to help resist it.
It would be profoundly immoral to let peace- 
loving friends depending on our help be over­
whelmed by brute force if we have any capacity 
to prevent it."5
A number of more recent policy statements by the 
Reagan administration show more clearly that external 
justifications are characterized by an emphasis on moral 
and ideological arguments. (It will be shown later that 
internal justifications reflect a greater concern for 
national interests). During a news conference on Feb­
ruary 24, 1988, President Reagan spoke on U.S. policy in 
Central America. Roughly 80 percent of the speech con­
cerned the plight of the "people of Nicaragua" and the 
need for democracy in that country.6 In ideologically 
charged rhetoric Reagan repeatedly referred to the con- 
tras as "the democratic resistance" and "freedom fight-
5Ibid., 25.
6The author performed an unscientific content anal­
ysis of the text of the speech to determine that 4/5 of 
the speech was concerned with moral arguments for U.S. 
policy. For a copy of the speech see "News Conference of 
February 24," Department of State Bulletin, May 1988, 9- 
12.
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ers.1 After lauding the progress of the other govern­
ments in Central America, Reagan concluded, "One country, 
Nicaragua, with its communist regime, remains a threat to 
this democratic tide in the region."7
President Reagan's statement was seconded by Sec­
retary of State George Shultz two weeks later in a speech 
before the Subcommittee on Foreign Operations of the 
House Appropriations Committee. Like his boss, Secretary 
Shultz focussed on the "brutality of the communists" and 
the need for Congress and the American people to reaffirm 
"our commitment to forces fighting for peace and freedom" 
in Nicaragua.8 By reinforcing the President's views, 
Shultz strengthened the hand of the administration when 
it faced opposition in Nicaragua and in Congress. To 
display disagreement in the external realm would appear 
as a sign of a lack of resolve.
The appearance of unity within the government is an 
important aspect of the external justification. Usually, 
there is a single theme running throughout all external 
discussions of a given policy by administration sources.
A government needs to maintain the appearance of unity on
7Ibid., 11.
8For a copy of Shultz's address before Congress see 
"Meeting Our Foreign Policy Goals," Department of State 
Bulletin, May 1988, 12-13.
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major foreign policy issues if it is to be taken serious­
ly by other states. A lack of unity may damage the 
ability of the government to effectively carry out its 
policies. A good example of the difficulties arising 
from open disagreement was the debate between Secretary 
of State Cyrus Vance and National Security Advisor Zbig­
niew Brzezinski, which inhibited the effectiveness of the 
Carter administration's foreign policy. In June 1978 
Carter tried to clearly explain U.S. policy toward the 
Soviet Union, which at that time appeared ambiguous 
because of the public disagreement between the Presi­
dent's two leading advisors on the issue. Vance empha­
sized the need for detente, regional settlements, and 
arms control, while Brzezinski supported a harder line 
toward Moscow. The two most important administration 
spokesmen on foreign affairs, other than the president, 
were sending radically different signals to the Kremlin 
and to America's allies.9 Consequently, it was a widely 
held view that the administration did not establish a 
consensus or have a clear policy on a number of the most 
important issues involving the foreign policy of the
9Former White House speech writer for President 
Carter, James Fallows, discusses the problems of a public 
split in administration ranks in "The Passionless Pres­
idency," in Behind The Scenes in American Government, ed. 
Peter Woll (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 1983), 172-173.
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United States. President Carter went to great lengths to 
quell rumors of disunity; at one time he went so far as 
to make a speech for the express purpose of establishing 
a unified official line.10 If the international audience 
is unsure about the commitment and resolve of the 
American government toward its stated policies, allies 
may be less willing to lend support and adversaries may 
be emboldened. For this reason, any leading member of 
the executive who opposes some policy in the internal 
debate is nevertheless expected to support and justify 
the policy in terms that are consistent with the official 
line.
More recently, potential disunity within an admin­
istration— which threatened to damage the effectiveness 
of policy— was averted by the Reagan administration when
10In 1978 President Carter delivered a speech on 
U.S.-Soviet relations at the Naval Academy's graduation 
exercises. According to White House spokesmen, Carter 
decided to draft the speech himself "to erase the impres­
sion that his administration was deeply divided on na­
tional security policy." Robert C. Kaiser and Walter 
Pinkus, "Carter as Speechwriter: Limiting Split." Wash­
ington Post, June 8 1978, A18. The address failed to 
remedy the public perception of disunity; in fact, as the 
front page headline in the next day's paper indicated, 
the differences between various elements of the admin­
istration were actually accentuated. See Murrey Marder, 
"Two Different Speeches," Washington Post, June 8 1978, 
Al, and A20. Apparently a memo written by Vance served 
as the basis for the first two pages while Brzezinski's 
Cold War rhetoric was reflected in the remainder of the 
speech.
15
it maintained an unambiguous line on its controversial 
Strategic Defense Initiative (S.D.I.). Shortly after 
President Reagan presented his vision of a ballistic 
missile defense system to the American people in March 
1983, there was speculation that S.D.I. was to be used as 
a bargaining chip in arms control negotiations with the 
Soviet Union. Specifically, a number of mid-level 
bureaucrats in the State Department and the Defense 
Department who were involved in the A.B.M. Treaty negoti­
ations favored S.D.I. only as an inducement to the Krem­
lin— a goody to be given away. However, in response to 
this type of speculation and rumor, the administration's 
leading policy makers indicated their official unwavering 
support for the program, which was heralded as a step 
that would increase the stability of the strategic bal­
ance by enhancing deterrence while seeking a permanent 
solution to the problem of nuclear war. The pro-S.D.I. 
arguments offered by most officials were more subtle than 
the defensive shield imagined by President Reagan, but 
they did not contradict him on the U.S. commitment to 
eventual deployment. It is almost certain that not all 
these administration spokesmen felt this was the best 
reason to proceed with S.D.I. or that the U.S. should 
adopt the policy at all. But the adherence to and ap-
16
parent acceptance of the single external justification 
gave the policy added weight and political utility.
(Since everyone seemed serious about an effort to deploy 
a B.M.D. system, it really did make the Soviets sit up 
and take notice.)
Because the open collegial system which operates in 
the United States is not conducive to the type of focus 
and consensus needed in foreign affairs, U.S. administra­
tions are acutely aware of the danger posed by apparent 
disharmony within the government. Observers often re­
flect on the role of Congress in the American political 
system when explaining the patch work nature of U.S. 
foreign policy outputs. Ralph Dahrendorf suggests, "In 
the United States, quite contrary to its Constitutional 
assumptions, there is no simple notion of 'the execu­
tive' ; parts of Congress are involved in the great con­
sensus .1,11
Repeated cases of Congressional involvement in the 
foreign policy consensus can be seen in the Reagan ad­
ministration's Central American program. The executive's 
policy was watered down by Congress on the issue of
“Ralph Dahrendorf, "On the Governability of Demo­
cracies, " in Comparative Politics, ed. Roy C. Macridis 
and Bernard D. Brown (Chicago: The Dorsey Press, 1986), 
390.
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military aid to the contras, which was supposed to pres­
sure the Sandinistas toward democratic reforms.12 Experts 
in the N.S.C., the State Department and the Central 
Intelligence Agency calculated that the U.S.-backed 
contras would need certain resources to achieve certain 
objectives. (The Reagan administration, not the bureau­
cratic specialists, defined the objectives.) The ad­
ministration requested money (100,000 dollars) from the 
legislature— as it must for any program— -to aid the 
contras. In March 1986 Congress appropriated the funds 
with the stipulation that the money be used only for non­
combat purposes. According to administration sources, 
this amendment undercut the effectiveness of U.S. policy 
in Nicaragua. It certainly sent contradictory signals to 
American allies in the region who had been promised 
military support. Whether one agrees with the policy or 
not, the example demonstrates how carefully planned
12The real reason for and the internal justification 
for contra aid is a contentious point. Some observers, 
like Congressmen Edward Boland and journalist Bob Wood­
ward, insist the purpose of creating and supporting the 
resistance forces in Nicaragua was to overthrow the 
Nicaraguan government. The intricacies of the internal 
justification for this issue will be discussed in detail 
later. See Bob Woodward, Veil: The Secret Wars of the 
C .I.A. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 134-136,
175. See also the text of the "Boland Amendment." 
Continuing Resolution for Appropriations, United States 
Statutes at Large, 96, sec. 793 (Nicaragua and Honduras), 
1865 (21 December 1982) .
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policies of the executive can be altered so the appear­
ance of unity is destroyed.
A headache facing all American Presidents is the 
appearance of disunity as a result of the plethora of 
would-be Secretaries of State. The most recent leading 
American diplomat, Speaker of the House James Wright, 
decided to enter negotiations with Nicaraguan President 
Daniel Ortega in November 1987 after the Reagan admin­
istration consistently refused to do so. The difference 
between the administration's hard line toward the San- 
dinistas and the direct negotiations in Washington bet­
ween the Nicaraguan leader and a highly visible member of 
the United States Congress was construed as contradictory 
American policy. The Reagan administration complained 
that Wright's actions threatened to undercut the U.S. 
position of strength relative to the Sandinistas and its 
commitment to the contras.13
Some observers feel the costs of disunity are so 
great that institutional changes should be made to en­
courage coherence in foreign policy. George Kennan, 
former head of the State Department's Policy Planning 
Staff (P.P.S.), has argued repeatedly for constitutional
13John Goshko, "Reagan Hits Wright on Peace Talks," 
Washington Post, 17 November 1987, A22.
19
reform "which would give us a parliamentary system more 
nearly like that which exists in England." He insists 
"that Congress should leave the executors of policy 
unmolested so that they may consistently apply their 
expert knowledge in ways they have learned to know are 
wise. "14
Finally, legal, as well as moral and ideological 
claims are an important part of the external justifica­
tion of policy. It would be highly irregular for a 
decision-maker to argue for a certain policy on the basis 
of international law in the internal realm. While he may 
be concerned with enhancing the state's appearance as a 
law abiding member of the international order, it is 
unlikely a decision-maker would support a policy simply 
because it conformed to or upheld a non-domestic legal 
code. However, the use of international law and treaty 
commitments to explain policies in the external realm 
appears to lend a degree of legitimacy to policy and is 
therefore used frequently in public statements. In July 
1981 administration spokesmen before the Subcommittee on 
International Security Affairs defended the U.S. policy 
of military aid and arms transfers to friendly govern-
14George F. Kennan, American Diplomacy: 1900-1950
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 73, 94.
20
ments in Central and South America. "We are committed 
both by longstanding policy and by the Rio Treaty, to 
join with our Latin American allies in 'mutual assistance 
and common defense of the American republics.'1,15
The external justification is the alleged real 
reason for action.16 It is relatively clear and easy to 
define. In fact the State Department, which is respon­
sible for the formulation and explanation of U.S. foreign 
policy, releases official statements on most major policy 
issues. Often these official statements are explained 
and elaborated in press conferences, speeches, or The 
Department of State Bulletin. The internal justification 
is often less coherent and much harder to define than the 
external justification. Some of the characteristics of 
the internal justification are outlined below; however, 
the complex relationship between the internal and exter­
nal realms is more fully elaborated in later case 
studies.
15For a partial transcript of the testimony before 
the subcommittee on International Security Affairs see 
"U.S. Arms Transfers Policy Toward Latin America," De­
partment of State Bulletin, December 1981, 72.
16Dessler, 161.
21
Internal Justification
As in the external realm, justifications in the 
internal realm are characterized by arguments of national 
interest, ideology, legality and morality. However, 
unlike the external realm, there is a premium in the 
internal realm on weighing interests rather than subor­
dinating policy to universal values, international legal 
codes or ideological considerations. During discussions 
within the N.S.C., a participant might suggest that the 
policy of the United States toward Nicaragua should be to 
support the anti-Sandinista resistance forces there. In 
an attempt to convince other members of the N.S.C., the 
advocate of this action might support his stance by 
claiming such an option enhances the physical security of 
the United States. This would be a justification based 
on "national interests." On the other hand, he may argue 
for the same policy by claiming, as many have, that it is 
the moral obligation of the United States' government to 
support those forces in the world struggling for demo­
cracy and freedom so that all persons may enjoy their 
inalienable rights. Often the two arguments are inter­
woven and presented so they appear mutually reinforcing. 
In this example, the advocate would claim that because 
democratic forms of government are less likely to
22
threaten the United States than authoritarian govern­
ments, the U.S. ought to support the democratic forces in 
that country. In this way, the moral argument becomes an 
argument of national interest. If the preceding policy 
recommendation is accepted by the executive branch, the 
arguments offered above may become part of the internal 
justification for the policy. However, this does not 
imply that any argument offered in favor of the policy is 
part of the internal justification. To define the inter­
nal justification as a general theoretical category is 
considerably more difficult than pinpointing the external 
justification, which is offered in its entirety in writ­
ten and spoken form. Because of the manner in which 
policy is made, it would be incorrect to expect a single, 
coherent internal justification similar in form to the 
external one. The ambiguity of the internal realm is, in 
part, a consequence of the policy process.
A central problem in determining the internal jus­
tification for any policy or defining what constitutes an 
internal justification in general arises from the com­
plexities of the policy process itself. To imagine 
policy-making as an exercise in which fully planned and 
justified policy options are chosen from a pool of such
23
options is highly misleading.17 And yet, the presentation 
of the final policy with its comprehensive explanations 
gives the impression that the state could have chosen 
policy A, B, or C, whichever seemed best suited to 
achieve the purpose of furthering its national interests. 
This view assumes that governments act as their external 
justifications attempt to make them appear to act— with 
unity of purpose and with unanimous agreement on the 
means and ends to be employed. In other words, it as­
sumes the state is a unitary rational actor. In this 
view the state is viewed as a single person who relates 
means to ends in the most efficient way possible given 
finite information. Viotti and Kauppi explain the ra­
tional unitary-actor assumption: "The state speaks with 
one voice. . . . Given particular goals, states consider
feasible alternatives to achieve these goals in the light 
of their existing capabilities. . . . decision-makers
17A number of theorists and even some political 
leaders have viewed the policy process in this way. For 
example, Jimmy Carter once referred to his job as "one 
big multiple choice exam." As Bueno de Mesquita 
explains, ". . . each person rates alternatives as more 
or less desirable and chooses his or her most preferred 
alternative. . . .decision-makers calculate the costs 
and benefits of the alternatives open to them and choose 
the one that seems to yield the greatest advantage." 
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Forecasting Political Events 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985), 19.
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strive to achieve the best possible decision."18 Even if
Bueno de Mesquita is correct and people do make decisions
on the basis of maximizing expected utility, there is
still no reason to assume state decisions are made in a
unitary fashion or that the output will reflect such
focus and coherence.
Instead of completely "rational" policies that might
be like those expected from a single individual, most
policies are the result of considerable compromise and
revision. As Graham T. Allison explains,
Government behavior can thus be understood . .
. as outcomes of bargaining games. . . . The 
bureaucratic politics model sees no unitary 
actor but rather many actors as players, who 
focus not on a single strategic issue but on 
many diverse intranational problems as well, in 
terms of no consistent set of strategic objec­
tives but rather according to various concep­
tions of national, organizational, and personal 
goals, making government decisions not by ra­
tional choice but by the pulling and hauling 
that is politics.19
Coherent policy options and comprehensive plans are
quickly compromised and watered down by questioners and
detractors when they enter the process characterized by
18Paul Viotti and Mark Kauppi, International Rela­
tions Theory: Realism, Pluralism, Globalism (London: 
Macmillan, 1987), 32-33.
19Graham T. Allison, "Bureaucratic Politics," in 
Bureaucratic Power in National Politics, ed. Francis E. 
Rourke (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1978), 182.
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discussion and debate. The final product rarely resem­
bles the A, B, or C put forth by any one participant, but 
is instead an agglomeration or some combination of A, B, 
and C .20
While Congress plays a role in the policy process, 
internal justification is usually the product of bargain­
ing and compromise within the executive branch. The most 
important "pulling and hauling" in the internal realm 
takes place at the upper levels of the executive branch 
in cabinet level meetings and, on questions of foreign 
policy, in the National Security Council.
The N.S.C. was established by the National Security 
Act of 1947. Its statutory members are the President, 
Vice President, Secretary of State, and Secretary of 
Defense. Since the Eisenhower administration, presidents 
have regularly called on various other department heads 
and advisors to sit on the N.S.C. Thus, the Director of 
Central Intelligence, the National Security Advisor, and 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff are now de 
facto members of the N.S.C. All the members (with the 
possible exception of the National Security Advisor) are
20According to Allison, "What the nation does is 
sometimes the result of the triumph of one group over 
others. More often, however, different groups pulling in 
different directions yield a resultant distinct from what 
anyone intended. Ibid., 183.
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beholden to some institutional or electoral constituency. 
In their capacity as advisors to the president, all these 
individuals approach policy questions with certain inter­
ests and outlooks shaped by their responsibilities as 
department heads or elected officials.21 Therefore, an 
agreement on what policy option maximizes the national 
interest is unlikely; and even if all the assembled 
members calculate the national interest in the same 
manner, there is no guarantee that institutional inter­
ests or personal biases will not be calculated as equally 
important. Since the policy process is characterized by 
a number of participants with different outlooks and 
different interests,22 the outputs of a state are not the 
result of unitary rational choice as defined above.23
21In their investigation of the Iran/contra affair, 
the Tower Commission judged the N.S.C. in much the same 
way Allison had. They held the N.S.C. is ". . . biased
toward reaching consensus among these principals rather 
than developing options for Presidential decision." The 
Tower Commission Report (New York; Bantam Books Inc. and 
Times Books Inc., 1987), 12. For more complete discus­
sion see 6-15.
22Thomas E. Cronin estimates there are " . . .  more 
than fifty federal departments, agencies, and committees 
involved in some way in the administration or evaluation 
of U.S. foreign policy." The State of the Presidency 
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1975), 193.
23For a discussion of the effect of various organiza­
tional interests on the policy process see Morton Hal- 
pern, Bureaucratic Politics and U.S. Foreign Policy 
(Washington D.C.; The Brookings Institution, 1974);
Graham T. Allison, Essence of a Decision: Explaining the
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Of course, formal meetings of the N.S.C., N.S.P.G., 
P.P.S. or special committees formed to plan or implement 
foreign policy are not the only source of internal debate 
and justification. All levels of the executive branch 
communicate with one another through memos and reports 
that circulate within and among the White House, American 
embassies over seas, Congressional committees and the 
various bureaucracies. Informal meetings and conversa­
tions undoubtedly help define policies and justifica­
tions; but they are the most difficult to study.
Given the complexities and numerous inputs in the foreign 
policy process, one can appreciate the difficulty in 
determining the internal justification for any policy. 
Nevertheless, one needs some criteria for determining 
what constitutes an internal justification.
A set of reasons becomes part of the internal jus­
tification if it appears the elaboration of those reasons 
significantly affects the direction or composition of the 
policy chosen. One can judge this by frequent appearance 
of the same argument in the official record, such as 
internal memoranda and minutes of meetings, and to a 
lesser degree in memoirs, letters and diaries of the
Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little Brown and Co., 
1971).
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participants. One can also determine the effect of any 
view or justification on policy by knowing which par­
ticipants in the policy process possess the most influ­
ence on the issue. For example, if the President and the 
Secretary of State both argue for a policy and justify it 
with X, while an assistant Undersecretary of Defense 
justifies the same policy with Y, one can conclude that X 
is more important in shaping the chosen option and in 
causing its adoption as U.S. policy. In this case, if X 
and Y are mutually exclusive, then Y will not be con­
sidered part of the internal justification. If X and Y 
are not exclusive, then Y might help comprise the inter­
nal justification, but considerations expressed in X will 
be paramount. There are exceptions to the rules which 
define these theoretical categories, but as explained 
later, the categories are nevertheless useful in under­
standing policy decisions.
Determining the relative importance of various 
actors in the policy process is not always a simple task. 
The confusion following the public exposure of the Iran- 
contra affair demonstrates the difficulty of uncovering 
and defining the internal justification. In this case a 
number of leading administration officials, notably 
Secretary of State George Shultz and Defense Secretary
29
Caspar Weinberger, opposed the plan of dealing with a 
state known to support terrorist movements. President 
Reagan, who was in close contact with the families of 
hostages in the Middle East, was most concerned about the 
welfare of those Americans in captivity. National Secur­
ity Advisor Robert McFarlane saw the operation as a way 
to open channels of communication with moderate elements 
inside the Iranian government. For McFarlane the deal 
provided an opportunity for a strategic opening through 
improved American-Iranian relations. Finally, Oliver 
North and later Admiral John Poindexter supported the 
action for all the reasons outlined above; but as their 
testimony at Congressional hearings clearly showed, both 
embraced the plan primarily as a means to skirt legal 
constraints placed on the administration's program of 
support for the contras.
Because the President chose to proceed with the 
policy based on X, one might expect the internal jus­
tification elaborated by him to be paramount. However, 
the nature of the operation was such that Col. North had 
hands-on control. Consequently, while Reagan's X may 
have given the policy its initial acceptance, the results 
of the operation indicates it was carried out with 
North's concerns in mind. It is not surprising then,
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that North's primary objective of supplying the contras 
was largely achieved by the operation. On the other 
hand, the administration made minimal gains in its ef­
forts to obtain the release of hostages by dealing with 
the Iranians.24
If the variety of objectives and justifications 
given for the Iran-contra operation are not confusing 
enough, there is an additional problem involving the 
apparent lack of knowledge on the part of key administra­
tion officials. None of the bodies created to inves­
tigate the issue have been able to definitively determine 
who knew about important aspects of the operation. The 
apparent ignorance of key issues extended all the way up 
to the President. Fitting events into the categories 
outlined above is difficult just two years after the 
revelation of the policy; and as the wealth of material 
written on the subject suggests, there may always be 
disagreement on what the internal justification for the 
administration's policy was.25
24The United States gave military supplies to the 
Iranians on four occasions, each time with the expecta­
tion of obtaining the release of one or more hostages. 
After all transactions had been completed, only two 
hostages were released and both those at much higher cost 
than originally promised.
25A combination of sources gives the broadest picture 
concerning the internal dynamics of the Iran-contra 
initiative. See The Tower Commission Report; The Nation­
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Unlike the abstract framework outlined above, the 
internal and external realms are sometimes not completely 
distinct, especially in an open political system such as 
that which operates in the United States. Frequently 
members of Congress, allied governments and private 
interest groups penetrate the internal realm, making the 
theoretical categories actually more porous than their 
stated parameters indicate. As the Iran-contra example 
demonstrates, the criteria which define the stated theo­
retical categories are not necessarily accurate descrip­
tions of reality. Other historical cases reinforce this 
discrepancy between theory and practice.
During discussions at the White House in early 1965, 
leading members of Congress were invited to participate 
in the policy process and were privy to what must be 
considered the internal justification for the decision to 
commit ground combat forces in Vietnam.26 In a slightly 
different way the barrier between the internal and exter­
nal realms was breached during the Reagan administra­
tion's initial decision to provide aid to the contras in
al Security Archive's report, The Chronology: Account of 
Secret Military Assistance to Iran (New York: Warner 
Books, 1987); and Woodward, 412-503.
26A more detailed study of this point will be made in 
Chapter Three.
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the early 1980's. In this instance the administration 
was forced by law to inform Congressional intelligence 
oversight committees of ongoing covert operations. 
Committee members were exposed to at least a part of the 
internal justification for the policy which created and 
sustained an anti-communist guerrilla force in Central 
America. The Reagan administration informed the commit­
tees that the rationale for such a policy was the inter­
diction of military supplies entering El Salvador. 
However, because some members correctly suspected ul­
terior motives of the administration, such as the des­
tabilization and eventual overthrow of the regime in 
Managua, the pledge of silence was broken and they leaked 
the operation to the press. The oversight committees 
were designed to give Congress an insider's view of the 
policy process, but only a very weak influence on actual 
policy formulation.27 When members thought they were not 
being offered the actual internal justification, which
27What influence the committees do have stems from 
their "expected reaction" to a policy which is taken into 
account by the executive. The committees do not normally 
participate in the process by offering policy options as 
the executive branch players might.
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the administration feared might appear unacceptable, they 
leaked.28
While the internal-external model employs an artifi­
cial taxonomy which often simplifies aspects of the 
decision-making process, its categories are nevertheless 
useful as analytical tools. This framework offers three 
benefits to the observer of foreign affairs. First, it 
offers a system of classificatory terms with which one 
can uniformly define numerous events and cases over a 
broad range of issue areas. While each case is made up 
of particular details, the internal-external paradigm 
makes them comprehensible by revealing details as recurr­
ing phenomena in the policy process. Even though the 
internal and external realms may overlap in individual 
cases, the dichotomy offers an exhaustive classificatory 
scheme through which one can approach questions of jus­
tification . .
280ne reason for the hesitancy on the part of the 
executive branch to fully elaborate the internal jus­
tification is conditioned by a suspicion that the Con­
gressional committees leak information obtained in closed 
hearings. See The Tower Commission Report, 98. This 
same concern was voiced in 1965 by National Security 
Advisor McGeorge Bundy when he warned Johnson, "It is 
quite possible the (private) message to the Congress, 
once the President has determined our position, would be 
a message to the public." As quoted in George Kahin's, 
Intervention: How America Became Involved In Vietnam (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 369.
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Second, the distinction between internal and exter­
nal justificatory realms and the accompanying limits of 
each encourage the author and the reader to probe for 
"real" reasons and the essence of decisions. Too often, 
foreign policy analysts draw conclusions and support 
arguments based on public proclamations of governments.
By highlighting the internal-external dichotomy and 
keeping in mind the audiences of particular justifica­
tions, one will be less likely to search for the causes 
of policy in contrived presentations. This does not 
suggest that actual causes of policy can not be found in 
external justifications, but only that the analyst must 
be skeptical and attempt to find explanations consistent 
with the perceived interests of the state and the policy­
makers .
Third, there may be a relationship between a diver­
gence (or convergence) and the success, coherence, or 
acceptability of a policy. For example, it may be that 
under certain conditions the existence of a divergence 
will increase the likelihood that a policy is successful 
(or vice-versa). To determine this, future research must 
have a comprehensive and exhaustive scheme through which 
to define and classify raw data. If some correlation 
becomes apparent, its existence would likely be of some
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interest to policy makers as well as analysts.
Given this preliminary understanding of the defini­
tions and categories to be used in this study, it will be 
helpful to apply theory to actual decisions. In the 
application of theory a number of causes and various 
types of divergence between internal and external jus­
tification will emerge. By developing the relationship 
between the internal and external realms, the utility of 
the dichotomy for analysts, historians and policy-makers 
becomes evident.
CHAPTER II: CAUSES OF DIVERGENCE
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The executive may encourage a difference between the 
internal and external justifications -of a policy for a 
number of reasons. Some of the most obvious incentives 
for a divergence are the need to maintain ideological 
consistency, to score domestic political victories (or 
prevent defeats), to secure the support of Congress and 
the public, or to signal foreign allies and adversaries. 
By examining historical cases it will become clear how 
various considerations of the executive motivate diver­
gences between justificatory arguments in the external 
and internal realms.
The Period of Creation
The formative years of America's post-war foreign 
policy are highly instructive for any examination of the 
internal-external dichotomy. The global power vacuum 
left by the destruction of Japan and Germany and the 
severe weakening of the European colonial powers opened 
the door for the most materially rich and powerful nation 
in the world, the United States, to play the leading role 
in determining the shape of the post-war world. Of all 
the major powers, only the United States emerged from the 
war with sufficient economic and military strength to
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successfully organize a global recovery. The Truman 
administration sought to consolidate America's new posi­
tion as world leader, but this would require major com­
mitments of money and material to foreign countries. 
Because of isolationist traditions and a fiscally conser­
vative Congress, the administration's foreign policy 
goals faced substantial domestic impediments. By 1947 
America was completing a post-war reduction in its armed 
forces and defense budget; gaining public and Congres­
sional support for even relatively small foreign aid 
packages proved politically troublesome. For example, in 
194 6 it took six months to get a British reconstruction 
loan through Congress and then only after vicious debate. 
Reluctance on the part of the legislature to extend aid 
to Britain was surprising, given the closeness of the 
Anglo-American relationship developed during the war, the 
losses suffered by the British and the relative popu­
larity of Britain with the American public.1
1For a discussion of the politics of the loan see 
Robert J. Donovan, Conflict and Crisis (New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company, 1977), 281. See also H.B. Price, The 
Marshall Plan and Its Meaning (Ithica, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1955), 71-74. Former Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson described the attitude of the legis­
lators toward European aid in early 1947 as "one of 
hardly suppressed skepticism." Dean Acheson, Present at 
the Creation (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1969), 
221.
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Britain's retreat from Greece, India, and the Middle 
East in early 1947 signalled its inability to continue to 
play the role of world policeman. Therefore, the Truman 
administration determined major economic and military aid 
programs would be necessary to ensure political stability 
and economic recovery in those areas of the world vital 
to America's interests. The single most important step 
which set the United States on a course for world leader­
ship— and which also paved the way for the Marshall Plan 
and the formation of the Atlantic Alliance— was the 
decision to provide Greece and Turkey with economic, 
administrative and military aid sufficient to maintain 
their governments.2 Soon after he asked Congress to fund 
this program, the President's message became widely 
acclaimed as the "Truman Doctrine."
Throughout 194 6 Greece and Turkey became focal 
points in the escalating war of words and ideas between 
the Soviet Union and the Western powers. The Greek
2According to Joseph M. Jones of the Office of Pub­
lic Affairs and a participant in the policy discussions, 
"All. . . were aware that a major turning point in 
American history was taking place." Cited in Acheson, 
220. See also Louis J. Halle, who interprets the Truman 
Doctrine as "a new and definitive formulation of 
America's place and policy in the world." The Cold War 
as History (New York: Harper and Row, 1967), 109-112.
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government was losing control of the country in its civil 
war against Soviet supported insurgents. Turkey was 
repeatedly threatened by its Russian neighbor to the 
North; in August, 1946, Moscow demanded basing rights in 
the Bosporous. By early 1947 Britain's own economic woes 
made it increasingly difficult to ensure the continued 
existence of the Greek government or to maintain its own 
40,000 troops in that country. In February Britain's 
Ambassador in Washington delivered a message to the State 
Department indicating his government's intention to cease 
economic aid and recall its military personnel from 
Greece and Turkey in six weeks. The British abdicated 
with the hope that the United States would assume the 
burden in Turkey and Greece.
Internal Rationale for Greek-Turkish Aid
The decision to aid Greece and Turkey was shaped, 
in part, by a larger struggle developing between the 
superpowers. After the enthusiastic adoption of George
Kennan's "Long Telegram" by official Washington in early
*
194 6, foreign policy deliberations were infused with the 
need to contain the Soviet Union. The extension of 
Soviet power was assumed to be facilitated not just by 
the advance of the Red Army but by communist parties
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operating outside Moscow's orbit. For this reason many 
of the internal justifications for the decision to aid 
Greece and Turkey were implicit in the adoption of the 
policy. This becomes frighteningly clear when reviewing 
accounts of the decision-making process during this 
period. The discussion and debate surrounding the policy 
in the internal realm focussed on time-tables and capab­
ilities rather than reasons for adopting the policy. Few 
questioned whether it should be adopted at all.3 The 
central questions were 'how,' 'when,' and 'with what,' 
rather than 'why.'4 As soon as the British informed the
3George Kennan claimed to be part of a committee 
assigned "the task of recommending whether to respond 
affirmatively at all to the problem posed for us by the 
British withdrawal, or whether to leave the Greeks and 
Turks to their own devices." However, the chairman of 
the committee, Loy Henderson, and the acting Secretary of 
State, Dean Acheson, insist that question had been decid­
ed the day after the British note was received. As far 
as Acheson and Henderson were concerned the primary 
purpose of the committee was "to make suggestions as to 
how it (the decision to aid Greece and Turkey) should be 
explained and justified to other governmental depart­
ments, to Congress (whose action would obviously be 
necessary to give it effect), and to the public." See 
George F. Kennan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1967), 313-314; and Acheson, 217-219.
4Acheson, who was acting Secretary of State while 
General George Marshall attended the foreign ministers 
meeting in Moscow, assigned State Department analysts to 
determine "(1) facts as seen by the United States repre­
sentatives; (2) funds and personnel currently available; 
(3) funds and personnel needed;" and only fourth, "si­
gnificance of an independent Greece and Turkey to Western 
Europe." The assumption built into this list was that 
American interests were intimately related to political
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United States of its intention to withdraw, Truman and 
his advisors unanimously agreed on the necessity to 
provide Greece and Turkey with aid.5 Nevertheless, while 
the internal justifications were neither explicit nor 
were they the central focus of the internal discussions 
on the issue, they did exist.
The maintenance of a certain type of world order was 
viewed as the primary interest motivating the decision to 
aid Greece and Turkey. This meant that American deci­
sion-makers adopted policies that would: (1) promote
global peace and stability and (2) Encourage global 
economic recovery. These goals were thought to be mutu­
ally reinforcing since global peace and stability would 
naturally benefit the growth and recovery of the world 
economy. In essence, this meant keeping the industrial­
ized Western countries unified, something which had not 
been achieved in the inter-war period. A related con­
and economic vitality in Western Europe. Ibid., 217-219.
5When the administration realized that only the 
United States had the capability to prevent a collapse of 
the Greek government and ensure that Turkey not "become 
an untenable outpost in a sea of Communism," it earnestly 
assumed that responsibility. It is almost as if the mere 
existence of a vacuum was an incentive for the strongest 
power to fill it. Harry S. Truman, Years of Trial and 
Hope (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company Inc., 
1956), 100. See also Donovan, 279.
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sideration of decision-makers had, by 194 7, become almost 
a cliche'. The "lessons of Munich" and the folly of 
appeasement had become operational guidelines for the 
conduct of U.S. policy. Truman, Acheson, Marshall and 
even parts of the professional bureaucracy were quick to 
substitute Stalin for Hitler and the Soviet Union for 
Nazi Germany.6
The specific reasons offered in the internal realm 
to preserve Greek and Turkish independence in the face of 
Soviet pressure all related to the broader issues dis­
cussed above. While no one seriously raised the pos­
sibility of a Soviet invasion of Greece, Turkey or 
Western Europe, there was concern that these areas might 
be "lost by default." Marshall used this phrase repeat­
edly when explaining the potentially adverse effects of 
American indolence in this and comparable cases.7
6In 1945 Undersecretary of State Joseph Grew may 
have been the first within the administration to draw the 
parallel when he claimed the Soviet Union "will consti­
tute, in the future, as grave a threat to us as did the 
axis." Cited in Hugh Thomas, Armed Truce: The Beginnings 
of the Cold War, 1945-46 (New York: Atheneum, 1987), 137- 
138. In a letter to his wife one day after his famous 
speech to Congress of March 12, Truman wrote he had known 
at Potsdam "that there is no difference between total­
itarian or police states, call them what you will, Nazi, 
Fascist, Communist, or Argentine Republics." Donovan,
285.
7"Statement by the Secretary of State," Foreign 
Relations of the United States, 1947, Vol. 5, 60-62.
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Similarly, historian Herbert Feis explains it was not 
invasion, but political and military blackmail through 
which the Soviets could achieve their goals in Turkey. 
"American and British officials became nervous lest the 
Turks cave in and accede to Russian demands." To prevent 
a Kremlin-inspired Turko-Russian settlement, the American 
administration agreed with its counterpart in London that 
aid from the United States was needed as an unambiguous 
show of support.8 George Kennan expressed the same view 
in broader terms. Kennan, who by 1947 was the head of 
the State Department's newly created Policy Planning 
Staff (P.P.S.), claimed the Soviet threat existed prim­
arily in a political form; consequently, as long as the 
countries of Western Europe remained economically and 
politically vibrant, communism would make no significant 
inroads. Were the United States to abandon Europe, 
however, allowing its economic position to continue to 
deteriorate, the resulting chaos and destruction would be 
a breeding ground for communism. In that case, suggested 
Kennan, forces loyal to Moscow could score political 
victories and the governments of those countries might be
8Herbert Feis, From Trust to Terror (New York: W.W. 
Norton and Company, 1970), 178-183.
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forced to deal with the Soviet Union on unfavorable 
terms.9
A number of Truman's top advisors agreed that the 
U.S. should aid Greece and Turkey because a failure to 
act could have substantial negative repercussions on 
political stability in Europe and the state of order in 
the world.10 Specifically, they argued that those demo­
cratic forces in Italy and France under pressure from 
domestic communist parties would suffer a considerable 
psychological blow were Greece allowed to fall to the 
communists. While their own material conditions and 
security would not be threatened by the collapse of the 
Greek government, Kennan claimed "it was hard to overes­
timate, in those days of uncertainty and economic dif­
ficulty, the cumulative effect of sensational political 
events.,,n
9Kennan, 317, 351.
10In a March 1947 memorandum to Acheson, Under­
secretary of State William Clayton urged that 5 billion 
dollars be appropriated to help the devastated non-com­
munist countries. "The United States must take world 
leadership and quickly," he said, "to avert world dis­
aster." As cited in Donovan, 283.
nAs Kennan explained in a lecture at the National 
War College, "it is the shadows rather than the substance 
of things that moves the hearts, and sway the deeds of 
statesmen." Kennan, 318, 330-331, 351. For similar 
arguments by other participants in the policy process see 
Timothy P. Ireland, Creating the Entangling Alliance 
(Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press, 1981), 25-26; and John
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The fate of other nations in the Middle East was of 
considerable importance to American plans since oil from 
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab states would likely 
fuel any European economic recovery. Therefore, anything 
that threatened the flow of oil from the Middle East to 
Europe, such as the isolation of Turkey, the fall of 
Greece or the control of Iran by Soviet sponsored forces, 
was a grave concern of the administration in 1947.12
The importance of economic reconstruction was uncon­
tested in the internal realm. There was consensus that 
an obvious national interest was at stake. The produc­
tive capacity of the United States had doubled during 
World War II. If the rest of the world, especially 
Western Europe, did not recover economically, there was a
real danger that America would slip back into another
»
depression. As Barton Bernstein explains, "American 
democracy and prosperity at home depended upon an expand­
ing world economy and the extension of democracy
L. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1982), 35.
12For a discussion of the importance placed on 
American and European access to Middle Eastern oil during 
this period see Ireland, 51; Steven Spiegel, The Other 
Arab-Israeli Conflict (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1985), 30-35, 47; and "Cafferey to Marshall," 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Vol. Ill, 
711.
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abroad."13 Bernstein's explanation echoes the rationale 
found in a number of internal memoranda from the period. 
Clayton explicitly advocated the Greek-Turkish aid pro­
gram and later the Marshall Plan on the grounds that the 
continuing deterioration of the West European economy 
would have a "disastrous" effect on the American economy. 
The specific results of European economic collapse would 
be "Markets for our surplus product gone, unemployment, 
depression, a heavily unbalanced budget on the background 
of a mountainous war debt." The Ad Hoc Committee of the 
State-War-Navy Departments (S.W.N.C.C.), created in 
February 194 7 to study the logistics and requirements of 
assistance to Greece and Turkey and later to all of 
Europe, reached similar conclusions,14
External Justification: The "Hard Sell"
While leading members of the administration were 
convinced that the threat to American economic and secur­
ity interests in Greece and Turkey was sufficient to
13Barton J. Bernstein, "Walter Lippmann and the Early 
Cold War," in Cold War Critics, ed. Thomas G. Patterson 
(Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), 30.
14"The Director of the P.P.S. to the Under Secretary 
of State," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, 
Vol.Ill, The British Commonwealth, Europe (Washington: 
USGPO, 1972), 229-232.
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warrant an annual aid package of over 4 00 million dol­
lars, they were not at all sure that Congress or the 
American public would agree. If the public and the 
fiscally cautious Congress were not convinced of a severe 
and imminent threat, they might be reluctant to support 
the administration's proposed policy. Truman, Acheson 
and White House Staff Assistant Clark Clifford all felt 
that the complex and often cynical arguments offered in 
the internal realm— involving balance of power, spheres 
of influence and expanding world trade— would do little 
to convince legislators to allocate funds for or unite 
the country behind the aid program.15 In fact, the ad­
ministration made a conscious effort to "sell" the policy 
to the Congress and the American people.16
Without the appearance of an imminent ideological 
and military threat it is unclear whether Greek-Turkish 
aid (or the Marshall Plan) would have passed Congress. 
With this in mind, the administration employed a language
15For a detailed illustration of this point see David 
S. McLellan, Dean Acheson: The State Department Years 
(New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1976), 116-122; also 
Ireland, 25-26.
“According to Joseph Jones, who was involved in 
preparing Truman's famous speech to Congress, partici­
pants in drafting sessions offered observations starting: 
"The only way we can sell the public on our new policy 
is. . ."As cited in Halle, 119.
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of immediate crisis to move its programs through Congress 
and allay public criticism.17 It also drew public com­
parisons between the Soviet occupation of East European 
countries and the largely domestic political opposition 
in Greece and other European countries. In an attempt to 
present an image "clearer than truth" to its external 
audience, the administration overstated the severity of 
the Soviet military threat and marketed the policy as 
part of a global ideological struggle.
On March 12, 1947, Truman spoke before a joint 
session of Congress. He explained that during World War 
II Germany and Japan attempted to impose their way of 
life on other nations and then implied the Soviet Union 
was now doing the same. He then continued:
We shall not realize our objectives . . . un­
less we are willing to help free peoples to 
maintain their free institutions and their 
national integrity against aggressive movements 
that seek to impose upon them totalitarian 
regimes. . . . The peoples of a number of coun­
tries of the world have recently had total­
itarian regimes forced upon them against their 
will. The Government of the United States has 
made frequent protests against coercion and 
intimidation, in violation of the Yalta agree­
ment, in Poland, Rumania, and Bulgaria.
17Athan Theoharis, "The Rhetoric of Politics: Foreign 
Policy, Internal Security and Domestic Politics in the 
Truman Administration," in Politics and Policies of the 
Truman Administration, ed. Barton J. Bernstein (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1970), 214-217.
Truman then came to the controversial core of his ad­
dress: "I believe that it must be the policy of the 
United States to support free peoples who are resisting 
attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside 
pressures.1,18
The "outside pressures" to which Truman referred 
were undoubtedly allusions to the Soviet Union and its 
proxy forces abetting the Greek guerrillas from Albania, 
Yugoslavia and Bulgaria. By highlighting the possibility 
of Soviet military adventures in Europe, Truman opened a 
floodgate of alarmist pronouncements, speeches, and 
public studies which called attention to the apparent 
military edge which the Soviet Union maintained over the 
West in Europe. Two years later such efforts greatly 
facilitated the formation of the NATO Alliance.19
The fact that /the Soviet Union had a quantitative 
superiority over Western forces stationed in Central 
Europe is not disputed; however, there was a discrepancy 
between the intentions and capabilities of the Soviet 
Union as reported by American and British intelligence
18As cited in Donovan, 284 .
19If one of the primary goals of the administration 
was to avoid the divisions within the capitalist world 
that existed during the inter-war period, the perception 
of a Soviet threat and the subsequent formation of NATO 
did much to facilitate that goal.
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agencies and the picture painted by the administration 
for public consumption. The Soviet Union simply was not 
willing or able to fight a major land war in Europe 
during this period. Most intelligence coming into 
Washington insisted the Soviets sought to avoid a major 
conflict at almost all costs for at least 10 to 15 years 
after World War II.20 The State Department and the Moscow 
Embassy concurred that the Soviet Union had no intention 
of achieving its goals through direct military invasion 
of the West. In fact, after establishing the inferiority 
of Russian military strength, the Division of Research 
and Intelligence suggested "if a dispute in an existing 
area of conflict should definitely threaten war, the USSR 
would, during the period of its inferior war potential, 
back down before permitting the matter to come to a test 
of arms. "21
20For a review of such intelligence reports document­
ing the relative weakness of the Soviet economy and 
military capability see Office of Strategic Studies,"Mem­
orandum for the President: Problems and Objectives of 
U.S. Policy," May 1945, in Declassified Documents 
(Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1981) microfiche # 007622, 2; 
U.K. Joint Intelligence Sub-Committee, "Soviet Interests, 
Intentions, and Capabilities" (London: August 1947), 1-3, 
5, 7, Personal xerox copy; Central Intelligence Group, 
"Memorandum for the President," Oct. 30 1946 in, Declas­
sified Documents (Washington D.C.: USGPO, 1982) micro­
fiche # 000549.
21Department of State, "The Soviet Internal Situa­
tion," Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, Vol. 
V (Washington: USGPO, 1972), 623-627. Even as late as
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While the administration was not accurately repre­
senting the strength and intentions of the Soviet Union 
as its experts in the executive branch perceived them, it 
was presenting an image that would ensure its foreign 
policy goals the greatest chance of success. This con­
sideration lay at the heart of the divergence between the 
internal and external justifications for Truman's Greek- 
Turkish policy.
Besides magnifying the Soviet threat and defining it 
in military terms, the Truman administration emphasized 
the ideological roots of the conflict between the Soviet 
Union and the "free world.” The discussions concerning 
economic recovery and political blackmail so central to 
the internal justification were either muted or absent in 
the external justification. A number of foreign policy 
experts and political insiders noticed the grandiose and 
universal language used by the President in his address 
to Congress was unlike that used behind closed doors.
194 9 when the Cold War was in full swing the Moscow 
Embassy repeatedly reported Russia was in no position to 
enter into hostilities with the West. According to 
Ambassador Kirk, "while sudden unanticipated Soviet 
progress in the atomic field might possibly advance the 
date on which they would be prepared to accept or in­
itiate hostilities, such date would by no means be 'in 
the near future.'" Department of State, "Memo from 
Ambassador Kirk to Washington," Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1949, Vol. V (Washington: USGPO, 1972),
658.
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Marshall, Kennan, and Charles Bohlen were well aware of 
the internal justifications for the policy and, on the 
basis of such rationale, agreed the U.S. should assume 
Britain's role in Greece and Turkey. But while they all 
supported the policy, none had the opportunity to par­
ticipate in the drafting of the President's speech, which 
was produced by the State Department's public relations 
office with help from Acheson, Clifford, Jones, the 
S.W.N.C.C. and of course Truman.22
Kennan advanced two criticisms of the external 
justification offered in Truman's historic speech.
First, Truman's language suggested the criterion used to 
determine whether or not the U.S. should offer aid to 
Greece and Turkey was "proof of the existence of a threat 
'of subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pres­
sure.'" Besides the fact that this was not— and in 
Kennan's opinion should not have been— a central factor 
in the decision to offer aid in this case, it left open
22Kennan was invited to see the message a day before 
the final draft was sent to the White House. By that 
time his objections to the "sweeping language" of the 
speech were too late since "no one wanted to repeat the 
agony of collective drafting." Kennan, 315. Bohlen was 
accompanying Marshall to the Foreign Ministers meeting in 
Moscow, so neither of them knew the content of the Truman 
Doctrine until they received a copy of the speech during 
a stopover in Paris.
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the question of whether the United States would give aid
on that novel basis in the future. Second, Kennan held:
I would also take exception to the repeated 
suggestions, in the text of that message, that 
what we were concerned to defend in Greece was 
the democratic quality of the country's insti­
tutions. . . .  It was unwise to suggest that 
this, too, was an essential criterion.23
The Truman administration knew quite well it was not 
coming to the aid of "democratic forces" in Greece and 
Turkey but anti-communist and, in the case of Turkey, 
anti-Russian forces. Kennan was less concerned that such 
cynical considerations of power politics would be un­
palatable to the American public.24 Years later Kennan 
observed in Americans a "persistent urge to seek univer­
sal formulae or doctrines in which to clothe and justify 
particular actions."25
The State Department draft which Kennan criticized 
was sent to the White House on the 7th of March. There, 
Clifford and George Elsey were supposed to work it into a 
speech. Upon seeing the draft, Elsey, who was aware of 
the internal justification for the aid program, reacted
23Kennan, 321-322.
24A number of observers have documented the reaction­
ary nature of the Greek royalist forces in power after 
194 6. See Thomas, 384; Feis, 17 6. The Turkish Monarchy 
lacked even the veneer of a democratic political system.
25Kennan, 322.
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much as Kennan had. In a memorandum to Clifford, Elsey 
said: "There has been no overt action in the immediate 
past by the USSR which serves as an adequate pretext for 
such an 'All-out' speech." Reflecting his grasp of the 
subtle arguments which had justified the policy in the 
internal realm, Elsey continued, "The situation in Greece 
is relatively 'abstract;' there have been other instan­
ces— Iran for example— where the occasion more adequately 
justified such a speech."26
Bohlen and Marshall were equally alarmed by the tone 
of Truman's address. Upon receiving a copy of the speech 
in Paris Bohlen said, "it seemed to General Marshall and 
to me that there was a little too much flamboyant anti­
communism in the speech." But upon cabling his reserva­
tions back to Washington Marshall "received a reply that 
in the considered opinion of the executive branch, in­
cluding the President, the Senate would not approve the 
doctrine without the emphasis on the Communist danger."27
Little in the internal debates, or the "Washington 
consensus" discussed previously, prepared these analysts 
and statesmen for the sweeping ideological oratory
26Donovan, 282.
27Charles E. Bohlen, Witness to History: 1929-1969, 
(W.W. Norton and Company, 1973), 261.
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through which Truman justified the Greek-Turkish aid 
program to the American public and Congress. As far as 
the critics of.the external justification were concerned- 
-especially Kennan and Bohlen, who were the resident 
experts on the Soviet Union and thus keenly aware of its 
weaknesses— the speech was a distortion of reality. All 
the critics of the external justification readily ack­
nowledged the need for the United States to play an 
active role in the economic and political recovery of 
Western Europe and those states on the periphery of the 
Soviet sphere of influence. The potential costs of not 
acting forcefully would be the loss of these areas by 
default or the Finlandization of them through psychologi­
cal and political pressure applied by Moscow. However, 
Acheson, Truman, and his domestic political advisors were 
not sure this argument— or similar ones involving global 
economic recovery and the continued existence of world 
order— would be sufficient to sway a stingy Congress or a 
population leery of foreign aid programs. The internal 
arguments smacked of unsavory power politics. Therefore, 
the administration intentionally created a divergence 
between internal and external justifications. The exter­
nal audience would -have to be given certain types of 
reasons if the policy were to have a good chance of
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success. In this case the need to satisfy a domestic 
political audience conditioned a divergence between the 
justifications in the two realms.28
The tone of crisis in Truman's speech was largely 
due to the perceived need to gain Congressional support 
for his Greek-Turkish policy and, to a lesser extent, for 
future aid to Western Europe. However, Clifford later 
recalled an additional reason for the strident rhetoric. 
"We wanted to send a signal to Stalin."29 Presumably, 
Clifford felt that such a forceful act accompanied by 
strong words would restrain future Soviet adventures in 
areas where U.S. interests were involved. While domestic 
political impediments to Truman's policy were the primary 
cause of a divergence in this case, the consideration 
raised by Clifford would prove to be a significant cause 
of divergence in a number of historic issue areas, in­
cluding the.Berlin crises, U.S. entry into the Vietnam 
War, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.
28For a condensed version of the internal/external 
justification for the Greek-Turkish aid policy see table 
in Appendix A.
29Donovan, 283.
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The Need to Signal an International Audience
It is not a cliche to suggest the world is becoming 
a smaller place. Since World War II, the global popula­
tion has more than doubled; technological advances have 
made intercontinental travel a matter of hours rather 
than weeks; the entire world is linked by television and 
satellite communications; the underdeveloped countries 
are desperately seeking education and technological 
assets from the industrialized nations; and the West has 
become dependent on the third world for its natural 
resources. Because of increased interdependence, the 
political, economic and military decisions made by any 
state or group of states often have a direct impact on 
the welfare of a large number of other countries. For 
this reason, very few state actions go unnoticed by the 
international community. Therefore, political leaders 
and advisors must make decisions and justify them with 
the knowledge that they have an attentive audience. 
Raymond Cohen concludes that since governmental figures 
and their policies will be scrutinized, "all outward 
directed behavior is the product of careful delibera-
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tion."30 Policies are purposely chosen and justified for 
their effect on the attentive audience. Cohen points out 
that since all behavior is considered purposeful in 
international relations, observers attach meanings to all 
actions and words.
When the United States sent 15,000 troops to Hon­
duras for "training exercises" in the Spring of 1988, it 
was not simply an attempt to sharpen the military skills 
of its armed forces. For two months preceding the man­
euvers the Nicaraguan army had increased its number of 
penetrations across the Honduran border in skirmishes 
with the contras. The American training exercises were 
intended to show Managua that the U.S. noticed the incur­
sions and might take action to prevent them or retaliate 
with some other military means. The Sandinistas correct­
ly interpreted the signal and the border violations 
decreased. The geographic proximity and heightened 
readiness of a large contingent of American troops served 
as a clear warning to the Sandinistas. Even if the U.S. 
had intended no warning and was merely training military 
personnel, the Sandinistas would have interpreted the 
maneuvers as a signal because of an assumption of inten-
30Raymond Cohen, Theater of Power: The Art of Diplo­
matic Signalling (New York: Longman, 1987), 3.
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tionality.31 As discussed previously, all action in 
international relations is thought by the audience to be 
a deliberate attempt to communicate. In the context of 
Central America in early 1988, policy makers in 
Washington must have noticed that the Sandinistas would 
interpret the action as a warning.
Those states with the greatest political, military, 
and economic strength generally have the greatest in­
fluence on a large number of other states. Therefore, 
the big powers will be the most closely watched and thus 
have the greatest incentive to cultivate a certain rep­
utation. The United States has been the most closely 
watched country since 1945 and American political leaders 
have made policy with this fact in mind.
However, the mere existence of an attentive interna­
tional audience does not provide an incentive to formu­
late policies and justify them in ways that will satisfy 
the audience. American policy makers are concerned with
31According to Cohen "Contemporary observers can 
never be absolutely certain of others' real intentions. 
Hence they have top assume that actors do indeed intend 
the ostensible meanings of their acts. Since all actors 
know (or quickly learn) that all public acts, except 
those self evidently accidental of inadvertent, may be 
considered significant, the assumption tends to become a 
self-fulfilling prophecy." Furthermore "the assumption 
of intentionality is observed to be a working convention 
among diplomats and national security officers." Ibid, 
20.
60
the perceptions of the international audience (and shape 
their justifications accordingly) because those percep­
tions affect the ability of the United States to achieve 
its goals and pursue its interests. Others' perceptions 
of a nation matter and should be included in any attempt 
to measure a state's influence or power.
Reputation as a Factor of State Power
The realist school of thought in international 
relations focusses on power as the most important element 
determining interstate relations. The assumption of the 
primacy of power has been the focus of much debate in the 
field; unfortunately, the debate has been overshadowed by 
a persistence among both critics and advocates of the 
realist tradition to view power as a quantifiable asset 
based primarily on economic and military strength.32
32While a number of realists assert general defini­
tions of power which could account for a broad spectrum 
of variables, once put into practice material components 
of power are often represented out of all proportion to 
their actual significance in determining events. Paul 
Kennedy pays lip service to "cultural variables" and 
"international reputation" but when it comes to applying 
theory, power for Kennedy is determined by a state's 
economic base, military strength, geographic size and 
location, and population. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and 
Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), 
See also Bernstein's analysis of Walter Lippmann's 
material understanding of "balance of power considera­
tions." Bernstein, 47.
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Perhaps because these components of state power are the 
most easily measured and compared, analysts on both sides 
of the debate assume they are the most important elements 
in any power equation.
A crude critique of realism became popular after 
America's failure in Vietnam. Realism's critics claimed 
that a focus on power relations failed to predict and 
still fails to explain the American defeat in Vietnam.
The critics correctly claim the United States possessed 
many times the economic, military, and geopolitical power 
of North Vietnam. Therefore, concludes the argument, any 
analysis employing power relations as the singular ex­
planatory force in interstate affairs would fail to 
predict the outcome which is now history. Such explana­
tions fail to grasp the subtlety of power relations in 
interstate affairs. An examination of the power rela­
tions operating during the Vietnam War would be remiss 
were it not to define the limits within which each state 
could wield its power. The United States faced signifi­
cant military and political constraints on its power, 
some self-imposed and some imposed by states other than 
North Vietnam.33
33The Johnson administration was constrained by the 
expected negative reaction of the American people to an 
all-out war in Vietnam. More significantly, the admin­
istration felt itself restrained by the Soviet Union and
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Another factor that must be included in any discus­
sion of power is the role a state's reputation plays in 
shaping international expectations and attitudes. A 
state's ability to operate effectively and achieve its 
goals in an interdependent world is intimately linked to 
the perceptions that others have of the state. Decision­
makers act on the assumption that the long-term effects 
of an action may aid or hinder that state in its future 
relations with other states. According to Robert Keohane 
"a good reputation is like a capital asset: it will make
it easier to enter future international agreements, at 
lower costs."34 A traditional realist, Hans Morganthau, 
states the problem in the negative sense when he claims 
that nations which fail to observe treaties may exper­
ience a net loss "in the long run, since a nation that 
has the reputation for reneging on its commercial obliga-
communist China, whose potential presence in Vietnam 
negated the possibility of an invasion of the North. Any 
direct confrontation between the U.S. and either China or 
the Soviet Union was ruled out as potentially too costly. 
This consideration undoubtedly contributed to the outcome 
of the war'.
34Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and 
Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton: Prin­
ceton University Press, 1984), 105-106.
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tions will find it hard to conclude commercial treaties 
beneficial to itself."35
While both Keohane and Morganthau are discussing 
questions of international trade, the same dynamic is at 
work in the security realm. States seek to establish 
certain reputations not as ends in themselves, but be­
cause they are instrumentally useful for the state pursu­
ing its interests. Accordingly, nations do not act as 
crude act utilitarians. There may be instances where 
some policy will bring short-term gains, but in the long 
run, the costs of that action will outweigh whatever 
gains are made in the isolated instance. As long as 
political leaders and other policy makers act as if they 
believe their actions have long-term consequences on the 
status— and therefore the ability to achieve goals— of 
their state, they may not act to maximize immediate 
utility at the expense of reputation.
There appears to be a widely held belief among 
policy makers that the stakes in any conflictual inter­
state relationship are often much more subtle than a 
material balance of power model might suggest. Robert 
Tucker claims "specific conflicts of interest will be
35Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations, fourth 
edition (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1948/1967), 283.
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invested with a significance they would not otherwise 
have."36 Quite simply, situations arise where states 
devote lives, resources, and energy out of all proportion 
to the immediate material gains that could be achieved 
through such actions. In 1961 the Soviet Union chal­
lenged the American position in West Berlin. While the 
city added little to the West economically and was an 
indefensible military liability 100 miles inside the 
German Democratic Republic, the United States risked 
global war and significant political capital in defense 
of the American position in West Berlin. According to 
President Kennedy, West Berlin had
become, as never before, the great testing 
place of Western courage and will, a focal 
point where our solemn commitments. . . and 
Soviet ambitions now meet in basic confronta­
tion. . . If we do not meet our commitments in
Berlin, where will we later stand?37
In the Cuban missile crisis, which came one year later, 
policy makers in Washington were as concerned about the 
international reputation of the U.S. as much as they were 
about gaining or losing a strategic advantage. During 
the policy debates of October 1961 Kennedy down played
36Robert Osgood and Robert Tucker, Force, Order, and 
Justice (Balt:Johns Hopkins Press, 1967), 201.
37Ibid.
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the military significance of the missiles in Cuba, "it
doesn't make any difference if you get blown up by an
ICBM flying from the Soviet Union or one that was ninety
miles away."38 When Presidential Counsel Ted Sorensen
summed up the views of Ex Comm after the first two days
of deliberations he wrote:
It is generally agreed that these missiles, 
even when fully operational, do not signif­
icantly alter the balance of power. . . Never­
theless it is generally agreed that the United 
States cannot tolerate the known presence of 
offensive nuclear weapons in a country ninety 
miles from our shore, if our courage and com­
mitments are ever to be believed by either 
allies or adversaries.39
Had the United States backed down in Berlin or al­
lowed Soviet missiles to be publicly deployed in Cuba, 
the administration believed the U.S. would have suffered 
a grave blow to its reputation as a great power and cer­
tainly would have lost influence with both its allies and 
its adversaries in future crises. The allies, it was 
argued, would lose confidence in American commitments and
38Richard Neustadt and Ernest May, Thinking in Time 
(N.Y.: the Free Press, 1986), 9.
39Ibid, 9. The policy to "quarantine" Cuba brought 
the U.S. and the Soviet Union as close to war as they 
have been in the 40' years since 1945. Interestingly, the 
external justification for that policy stressed the 
military threat posed by the missiles in Cuba. The 
internal justification expressed the concerns of an ego 
contest.
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its adversaries might view the U.S. as a paper tiger that 
could be intimidated. An apparent loss of power would 
bring more challenges and increase the likelihood of 
future crises. It would not matter that the actual mil­
itary and economic capabilities of the United States were 
still preeminent and largely unchanged; America would 
have lost influence in the world.
Only war offers a final accounting of state power. 
The outcome of any confrontation short of war will be 
determined by the perceptions that actors have of each 
other. If country X and Country Y believe Y is more 
powerful than X, then Country Y is in practice more pow­
erful. Naturally, the material capabilities of Y will go 
some way in determining both countries' perceptions of 
Y's power, but the politically relevant factor is the 
belief— whether well fpunded or not-— that Y is stronger.
Perceptions and reputations have become increasingly 
important in determining events in international affairs 
over the past 40 years. Besides the obvious technologi­
cal improvements in communication, the strategic nuclear 
arsenals of the great powers have made all-out global war 
unthinkable. Since state power can no longer be deter­
mined through war, the subjective understanding of ana­
lysts and political leaders will determine actions and
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reactions in interstate affairs. Policy makers can no 
longer resort to a final accounting of power relations by 
choosing to go to war. The improbability of war has 
emphasized the importance of a state's reputation in 
determining its ability to achieve its objectives. 
Therefore, political leaders in the United States have 
gone to great lengths to protect or bolster the state's 
reputation. The case study in Chapter Three illustrates 
this point better than any theoretical discussion of the 
concern for reputation maintenance in determining a 
state's foreign policy. The consideration of the state's 
reputation helps to explain the perceived U.S. interest, 
eventual entry, and the difficulty of withdrawal from the 
Vietnam War.
CHAPTER III; TYPES OF DIVERGENCE
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A divergence between internal and external justifi­
cations may be caused by a number of different factors 
and may appear in a variety of forms. Examination of 
particular cases reveals the various ways in which diver­
gence can manifest itself. Until now, "divergence” has 
been used to describe instances where the content of the 
internal and external justifications was not the same. 
Truman and his advisors said one thing behind closed 
doors and something entirely different to the public and 
Congress. This type of divergence is the easiest to 
identify and will be called a "simple" divergence.
Another type of divergence is evident in cases where the 
same justifications are given in the internal and exter­
nal realms, but the emphasis on particular reasons for 
the policy is different in the two forums. This type of 
qualitative divergence existed at the time the U.S. 
government decided to deploy ground combat forces in 
Vietnam. In this case little or nothing was being with­
held from the external audiences; instead, the same 
material was being presented in a different way.1
1This study is concerned with similarities or dif­
ferences in justificatory arguments; therefore, when it 
is said that nothing was being withheld from the public 
this does not refer to the inaccurate reporting of body 
counts or "successful" pacification efforts. The Johnson
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Vietnam: A "Divergence of Order"
As illustrated in Chapter One, the set of reasons 
which comprise a justification can be hierarchically 
ranked in order of importance. When the order of par­
ticular reasons for a policy is obviously different in 
the internal and external realms, there exists a "dive­
rgence of order." This type of divergence is evident in 
the Johnson administration's policy toward Vietnam in 
1964-1965. The internal justification for deployment of 
ground combat troops focused on the position of the 
United States as a superpower in the world. However, 
while the external justification contained the considera­
tions which drove the internal debate, it stressed the 
American obligation to preserve the right of the people 
of the Republic of Vietnam to remain "independent and 
free from communist tyranny." This discussion of the 
internal and external justifications for the U.S. policy 
to commit combat troops demonstrates how a divergence can
administration did confront a "credibility gap" due to 
its rosy predictions which seemed to contradict televised 
reports of the war, especially after the Tet offensive in 
1968. However, the arguments which the administration 
used as rationale for its entry into the war were roughly 
the same in the internal and external realms.
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exist while the content of the justifications in both 
realms is roughly the same.2
By 1964 the position of the American backed regime 
in Saigon had reached a critical stage. After the assas­
sination of Diem, a series of inefficient military juntas 
and dictatorial governments failed to put down the Na­
tional Liberation Front (N.L.F.) insurgency or effective­
ly address the underlying political problems facing the 
country. In an attempt to bolster the confidence of its 
allies in the South, the United States embarked on a 
bombing campaign that was ostensibly started in response 
to North Vietnamese attacks on U.S. warships.3 However, 
at the behest of McGeorge Bundy, Assistant Secretary of 
Defense John McNaughton, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
(J.C.S.), the "tit for tat" bombing raids soon became a 
program of gradually intensified "sustained reprisals"
2While official pronouncements on U.S. policy in 
Vietnam contained virtually all the accepted arguments 
presented behind closed doors, (the internal justifica­
tion) the reverse was not true. Many internal discus­
sions and memorandums made no reference to moral and 
ideological arguments which were a staple of the external 
justification.
3For a discussion of the alleged attacks on the 
U.S.S. Maddox and Turner Joy in the Tonkin Gulf which 
preceded U.S. reprisals see George C. Herring, America's 
Longest War (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1986), 116-129.
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against targets in the North.4 The bombing raids, while 
highly destructive, did little to improve the political 
situation in South Vietnam. When it appeared the Saigon 
regime might not survive without direct American military 
intervention, American policy makers initiated what was 
until then the most intense internal policy debate on 
American strategy and objectives in South East Asia.
Internal Justification: Supremacy of National Credibility
After the decision to deploy two battalions of U.S. 
Marines to protect the airbase at DaNang in early 1965, a 
series of increasing pressures pushed President Johnson 
toward the decision to commit significant numbers of 
American troops to the war effort. At first General 
William Westmoreland and the Joint Chiefs were the prin­
cipal advocates of intervention; however, between Feb­
ruary and July of 1965, almost all the President's lead­
ing advisors advocated direct U.S. entry into the land 
war. Even Ambassador Maxwell Taylor, who initially 
advocated a compromise "enclave strategy," soon fell in
4Lyndon B. Johnson, The Vantage Point: Perspectives 
of the Presidency, 1963-1969 (New York: Holt Rinehart and 
Winston, 1971), 127-128.
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line.5 Only Undersecretary of State George Ball and 
Johnson's personal advisor, Clark Clifford, insisted a 
commitment of troops would be a mistake. Ball expressed 
concern that the adoption of Westmoreland's proposals, 
which called for the introduction of 150,000 American 
troops, would lead to a "protracted war involving an 
open-ended commitment of U.S. forces, mounting U.S. 
casualties, no assurances of a satisfactory solution, and 
a serious danger of escalation." He concluded that after 
such a large and visible commitment to the continued 
existence of South Vietnam, "Our involvement will be so 
great that we cannot— without national humiliation— stop 
short of achieving our complete objectives."6 In pre­
senting his objections to a troop deployment, Ball vocal-
5Taylor's enclave strategy effectively left the land 
war to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (A.R.V.N.), 
while the U.S. troops stayed within a 50 mile radius of 
the airfields and strategic positions they were assigned 
to protect. This cautious approach was abandoned in mid- 
1965 after a fact finding mission led Defense Secretary 
Robert McNamara to agree with Westmoreland that U.S. 
forces should "take the war to the enemy." For details 
see Bruce Palmer's, The 25 Year War (New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 1984), 41-42.
6"Ball to Johnson," July 1, 1965, Pentagon Papers, 
Sheehan ed. (New York: New York Times Publishing, 1972), 
449-454. In a more poetic moment, Ball restated his 
concerns, "Once on the tiger's back, we cannot be sure of 
picking the place to dismount." George W. Ball, The Past 
Has Another Pattern (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
1982), 380.
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ized the crucial consideration on which the issue would 
be decided— namely, the effect of deployment or with­
drawal on the validity of U.S. commitments around the 
world.
Most of the participants involved in the policy 
debates of 1964-1965 agreed with Ball that the United 
States should be fundamentally concerned with maintaining 
a certain image and avoiding national humiliation.
Damage to U.S. credibility was the crucial cost to be 
managed.7 The reputation of the United States as a reso­
lute adversary and a loyal ally was viewed as the founda­
tion for world order.8 If the U.S. decided to commit 
ground forces it would be serving notice that the stakes 
in Vietnam were paramount. Therefore, as America became 
more directly involved, the importance of Vietnam grew 
out of all proportion to its physical and strategic
7Unlike most contemporary critics of the war, Ball 
(and his colleagues) was less concerned that American 
lives, property, and strategic assets and moral virtue 
would be lost in Vietnam than he was that U.S. prestige 
would be damaged— and hence America's position as a 
superpower in the world.
8The "central lesson of our time" was learned at 
Munich according to Johnson. Appeasement of aggressive 
states was viewed as an invitation to more aggression and 
a major impediment to world order. Kathleen J. Turner, 
Lyndon Johnson's Dual War: Vietnam and the Press.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985), 3, 23-24, 
51-53.
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position in the world. Washington focused on the United 
States perceptions of itself and more importantly, on the 
international community's perceptions of U.S. actions.
While Vietnam had little strategic, economic, or 
even cultural value to the United States, Johnson and his 
advisors were convinced that allowing the Saigon regime 
to fall would weaken American influence and encourage 
disorder throughout the world.9 If the United States 
pulled out of Vietnam in 1965, Johnson warned, "it might 
as well give up everywhere else— pull out of Berlin, 
Japan, South America."10 The overriding concern was not 
the loss of Vietnam itself, but the effect a successful 
revolution might have on world order. The United States, 
as the economic and political giant of the free world had 
a clear interest in maintaining global stability so it 
could normalize relations with the Soviet Union and 
continue to lead the expansion of the world market. If 
any state had a stake in the institutionalization of the 
status quo it was the United States. The long-range
9In describing U.S. interests and objectives in 
Vietnam Palmer claims "South Vietnam was not vital to the 
United States." However by 1965 "our credibility world­
wide" became "an important U.S. interest." Vietnam would 
test American credibility. Palmer, 28.
10Herring, 141. The administration felt that the way 
it responded to "communist provocations" in Vietnam would 
have "profound consequences everywhere." Ibid., 115.
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intelligence estimates coming into Washington during 
1964-1965 warned "revolution and disorder" had become 
"epidemic" within the developing countries. The C.I.A. 
believed there was a greater chance the superpowers would 
be drawn, possibly against their will, into direct con­
frontation if such third world conflicts continued un­
checked.11
The American Cold War obsession with containing 
communism and preventing the spread of revolutionary 
movements was conditioned by a U.S. consensus originally 
elaborated in NSC-68 and strengthened by the American 
experience in Korea. In the case of Vietnam the long­
term consensus became codified— and American policy 
implicitly sanctioned by the bi-partisan foreign policy 
establishment— when Johnson in July 1965 consulted a 
panel of "wise m^n." The group consisted largely of 
former statesmen, advisors, and military men whose task 
was to consider the U.S. position in Vietnam and make 
recommendations directly to the President. One of the 
questions the panel was asked to address was: "To what
11C.I.A., "Trends In the World Situation," June 9, 
1964, Declassified Documents Quarterly Catalog, micro­
fiche 00075, 251A. It was assumed that a U.S. withdrawal 
from Vietnam would threaten global stability by giving a 
green light to every would be nationalist revolutionary 
in the developing world.
76
extent would a communist takeover in South Vietnam, in 
the face of the U.S. commitment, affect U.S. credibility 
and standing in holding on to key areas such as Northeast 
Asia, the Philippines, India, and even Europe?" William 
Bundy describes the panel's response as "clear and unmis­
takable." The wise men agreed with the administration 
that the stakes were "very high indeed." If the regime 
in Saigon was not bolstered, "deGaulle would then find 
many takers for his argument that the U.S. could not be 
counted on to defend Europe." The panel also agreed 
"that Vietnam was a test case for 'wars of national 
liberation' and that a U.S. defeat would lead to wide­
spread questioning whether U.S. commitments could be 
relied on." According to Bundy, "The panel thought that 
standing firm in Vietnam was of very great importance to 
American interests and to the independence of many na­
tions and areas."12
Every President from Truman to Johnson had made 
repeated public statements in support of the non-com­
munist political forces in Vietnam which, after the 
Geneva Accords of 1954, were located exclusively below 
the 17th parallel. Eisenhower and Dulles legally com-
12George Kahin, Intervention: How America Became 
Involved In Vietnam (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1986), 360- 
361.
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mitted the U.S. to the defense of South Vietnam through 
the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). Kennedy 
increased military and economic aid to the Saigon regime. 
Shortly after taking over from Kennedy in November 1963, 
Johnson assured Congress that America would uphold its 
commitments "from South Vietnam to West Berlin."13 The 
consensus within the administration held that the reputa­
tion of the United States rested on the fulfillment of 
these promises.14 The administration considered the costs 
of abandoning South Vietnam— measured in terms of damage
13Kathleen J. Turner, Lyndon Johnson's Dual War: 
Vietnam and the Press (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1985), 53-54. As early as May 1961 Johnson's 
concern with Vietnam rested on a belief that the percep­
tion other states held of the U.S. was a fundamental 
factor in determining American power and influence. Upon 
return from a trip to South East Asia, then Vice Presi­
dent Johnson reported to President Kennedy, "The alterna­
tive to aiding the countries of that region was to throw 
in the towel...and pull our defenses back to San Francis­
co. . . . (W)e would say to the world. . .that we don't
live up to treaties and don't stand by our friends." 
"Johnson to Kennedy," May 23, 1961, Pentagon Papers,
Vol.II, Gravel Edition (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), 58- 
59.
14A11 the leading members of the administration were 
heavily conditioned by the "lessons of World War II." In 
a meeting of the N.S.C. General Wheeler insisted the cost 
of appeasement would be a wider war. "If we walk out of 
this one, we will just have to face others." At the same 
meeting former ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam, 
Henry Cabot Lodge, invoked the analogy viewed with almost 
religious reverence by official Washington. He argued 
there was an increased chance of global war "if we don't 
go in. Can't we see the similarity to our own indolence 
at Munich." Kahin, 37 8.
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to its reputation— as greater than the costs of going to 
war.
Johnson and his advisors were quite specific in 
their concerns about how U.S. influence— and as a result 
its material interests— would be adversely affected by a 
failure to commit troops in Vietnam. The explicit U.S. 
promise to ensure the independence of South Vietnam was 
thought to focus world attention on the credibility of 
the strongest nation in the world. America's adversaries 
in Moscow, Peking, and numerous nationalist movements 
would supposedly interpret the U.S. response in Vietnam 
as a deliberate signal. The majority view assumed 
American allies would be reassured and her adversaries 
would be more cautious if the U.S. stood firm. Given the 
steadily worsening situation in the South, this meant 
sending combat troops.
McGeorge Bundy stressed the importance of increasing 
U.S. forces in Vietnam as it related to "boosting the 
morale" of anti-communist forces in the South. General 
Earl Wheeler agreed, stating, "our additional forces will 
stave off a deteriorating situation." Admiral David 
McDonald argued against the critics of intervention, 
insisting "our allies will lose faith in us" if we do not 
"pour in more men." He was most concerned with the
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policy's beneficial effects on other countries in South 
East Asia such as Thailand, Burma, and the Philippines.15
More often participants argued America's adversaries 
would be emboldened by a U.S. withdrawal. In a meeting 
at the White House in July, 1965, Secretary of State Dean 
Rusk insisted, "It is more important to convince the 
communist leadership of this (that the U.S. would honor 
its commitments through military intervention) than to 
worry about the opinion of non-communist countries." 
McNamara agreed with Rusk when the Secretary of State 
said, "If the communist world finds out we will not 
pursue our commitments to the end, I don't know where 
they will stay there hand."16 While some of the mili­
tary participants in the policy debates mentioned the 
need to win the war in Vietnam, it is clear that some 
within the administration felt all that was needed to 
achieve the goal of reputation maintenance was a visible 
effort. All the principals thought a military victory 
was desirable, but some, notably McNaughton and McNamara 
from the Defense Department, did not view it as necessary 
to achieve the primary internal objective. In a memo to 
the President on July 20, 1965, McNamara argued for a
15Kahin, 310, 380-381.
16Ibid., 377.
80
’’prompt and substantial" increase in the number of 
American troops operating in South Vietnam and claimed 
his recommendation would "offer a good chance of produc­
ing a favorable settlement in the longer run; at the same 
time it would imply a commitment to see a fighting war 
clear through at considerable cost and casualties and 
material.’*17 McNamara's argument rested on the assumption 
that to fight a war and incur all the concomitant costs 
was itself the strongest signal a nation could send to 
bolster the credibility of its spoken word. By Herring's 
account, "Even if the United States could not hold South 
Vietnam, Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton 
argued, it would appear stronger to allies and adver­
saries alike if it 'kept slugging away' rather than 
meekly accepting defeat.’’18 In this view the outcome of 
the war was of secondary importance; what was needed to 
signal the world that the United States would keep its 
promises was a huge effort and the loss of American 
lives.
Ball, the administration's principal critic, never 
disagreed with what the establishment claimed was at 
stake in Vietnam: America's reputation as a resolute
17Ibid., 363.
laHerring, 128-129.
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world power. He simply felt that the risks of losing a 
war to a group of guerrillas was potentially more damag­
ing to America's reputation than reneging on a commitment 
to save a government that lacked legitimacy in the eyes 
of its own people and that would surely fall without U.S. 
help. Unlike subsequent critics, Ball did not oppose the 
troop deployments (or the war in general) on moral 
grounds, but with respect to minimizing the damage to 
U.S. national interests— which were intimately linked 
with the image other states held of America.
The following is a selected account of the discus­
sions which took place in the White House in late July 
1965 as recalled by President Johnson's aid Jack Valenti. 
Ball was clearly in agreement with the ends to be 
achieved— or avoided— in Vietnam, even though his policy 
recommendation differed from the consensus.
Secretary McNamara had recently proposed the deploy­
ment of 100,000 troops and most of the principals in the 
discussion supported the plan. Johnson was still search­
ing for alternatives and Ball was acknowledged as the 
official devil's advocate.
President: But, George, is there another course 
in the national interest, some course that is 
better than the one McNamara proposes? We know 
it is dangerous and perilous, but the big ques­
tion is, can it be avoided?
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Ball: If we get bogged down, our cost might be 
substantially greater. The pressures to create 
a larger war would be irresistible. The quali­
fications I have are not due to the fact that I 
think we are in a bad moral position.
President: Tell me then, what other road can I 
go?
Ball: Take what precautions we can, Mr. Presi­
dent. Take our losses, let their government 
fall apart, negotiate, discuss, knowing full 
well there will be a probable take-over by the 
Communists.
President: . . . Are you able to outline your
doubts? Can you offer another course of ac­
tion? I think it's desirable to hear you out, 
truly hear you out, then I can determine if 
your suggestions are sound and ready to be 
followed, which I am prepared to do if I am 
convinced.
Ball: Yes, Mr. President. I think I can pre­
sent to you the least bad of two courses. What 
I would present is a course that is costly, but 
can be limited to short-term costs. . . .  I am 
concerned about world opinion. If we could win 
in a year's time, and win decisively, world 
opinion would be alright. However, if the war 
is long and protracted, as I believe it will 
be, then we will suffer because the world's 
greatest power cannot defeat guerrillas. . . .
I think a long, protracted war will disclose 
our weakness, not our strength. (Ball goes on 
to explain his concerns as they relate to the 
perceptions of U.S. allies in Taiwan, South 
Korea, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and 
Japan.)
President: But George, wouldn't all these coun­
tries say that Uncle Sam was a paper tiger, 
wouldn't we lose credibility breaking the word 
of three presidents, if we did as you have 
proposed? It would seem to be an irreparable 
blow. But I gather you don't think so.
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Ball: No, sir. The worse blow would be that 
the mightiest power on earth is unable to de­
feat a handful of guerrillas.
President: Then you are not basically troubled 
by what the world would say about our pulling 
out?
Ball: If we were actively helping a country 
with a stable viable government, it would be a 
vastly different story. Western Europeans look 
upon us as if we got ourselves into an impru­
dent situation.19
While Ball criticized the policy recommendations of 
the majority, he did not disagree with the justification 
for the policy. As the record shows, Ball was in com­
plete agreement with the expressed purpose of the policy.
The most parsimonious articulation of the internal 
rationale that guided debate on the administration's 
Vietnam policy is found in a March 1965 memorandum from 
McNaughton to McNamara. There McNaughton weighted U.S. 
objectives in Vietnam as: "70% to preserve our national 
honor as a guarantor (and the reciprocal: to avoid a 
show-case success for Communist 'wars of liberation'),
20% to keep SVN (and their adjacent) territory free from 
hostile expansive hands, 10% To permit the people of SVN 
to enjoy a better, freer way of life." McNaughton's list 
of U.S. objectives is reflected in the official record
19Jack Valenti, A Very Human President (New York: W. 
W. Norton and Company, 1975), 328-335.
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where, as discussed previously, the overriding concern
among all the principals was the reputation of the United
States. In the conclusion of the same memo, McNaughton
echoed the concerns that were the focus of the policy
debate in the internal realm.
It is essential— however badly SEA (Southeast 
Asia) may go over the next 1-3 years— that the 
U.S. emerge as a "good doctor." We must have 
kept promises, been tough, taken risks, gotten 
bloodied and hurt the enemy very badly. We 
must avoid harmful appearances which will af­
fect judgments by, and provide pretexts to, 
other nations regarding how the U.S. will be­
have in future cases of particular interest to 
those nations— regarding U.S. policy, power, 
resolve and competence to deal with their prob­
lems .20
External Justification: Moral and Legal Preeminence
The emphasis on reputation maintenance in the inter­
nal realm lies in stark contrast to the alleged impor­
tance of various reasons given for the administration's 
policy in the external realm. In fact, the order in 
which particular reasons for the Vietnam policy were 
presented in public pronouncements were often reversed 
from their positions in the internal justification.
While McNaughton stressed America's future credibility as 
70% responsible for the need to pursue a policy of inter­
20As cited in Kahin, 313, 357.
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vention, policy statements from 1964 to 1966 painted 
quite a different picture. In March 1964 McNamara ex­
plained U.S. objectives and interests to the public in 
reverse order to those later elaborated by "the person on 
whom McNamara depended most in developing his approach to 
Vietnam," John McNaughton.21 According to the Secretary 
of Defense:
The U.S. role in South Vietnam, then, is first, 
and most importantly, to answer the call of the 
South Vietnamese, a member nation of our free- 
world family, to help them save their country 
for themselves; second, to help prevent the 
strategic danger which would exist if communism 
absorbed Southeast Asia's people and resources; 
and third, to prove in the Vietnamese test case 
that the free-world can cope with communist 
'wars of liberation' as we have coped success­
fully with communist aggression at other 
levels .22
Johnson's most famous public address on the conflict 
in Vietnam came on April 7, 1965, and has since become 
known as "The Johns Hopkins Speech." Many analysts have 
correctly pointed out that the internal justification for 
the administration's policy was extensively elaborated 
here in the external realm. Using language and logic
21Ibid., 356.
22In the original, the words "first., second, and 
third" were italicized. Robert S. McNamara, Secretary of 
Defense, "United States Policy In Vietnam," for text of 
speech see Pentagon Papers, Vol.Ill, Gravel Edition 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), 712-715.
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reminiscent of McNamara's memos, the President informed 
60 million American television viewers that world order 
depended on the credibility of the American commitment to 
South Vietnam. However, while the external justification 
incorporated the substance of arguments made behind 
closed doors at the White House, these considerations 
were subordinated to moral reasons for the policy.23 The 
first quarter of Johnson's speech contained themes such 
as "the principles for which our ancestors fought," 
"peace" and the "unparalleled brutality" of the war 
started and perpetuated by "aggression from the North."
23"Text of the President's Address on U.S. Policy in 
Vietnam," New York Times, April 8 1965, 16. For 
Johnson's discussion of the importance of Vietnam as a 
place where America must prove the value of its promises 
to allies and adversaries see paragraphs 17-18, 21-31,
34. This explanation was not restricted to the Presi­
dent's speech. In an interview on August 9 1965 Secre­
tary of State Rusk discussed publicly what was at that 
time the central internal justification for escalation. 
"The fact is that we know we have a commitment. The 
South Vietnamese know we have a commitment. The Com­
munist world knows we have a commitment. The rest of the 
world knows it. Now, this means that the integrity of 
the American commitment is at the heart of the problem.
I believe that the integrity of the American commitment 
is the principal structure of peace throughout the world. 
Now, if our allies or, more particularly, if our adver­
saries should discover that the American commitment is 
not worth anything, then the world would face dangers of 
which we have not yet dreamed. And so it is important 
for us to make good" on that American commitment to South 
Viet-Nam." Secretary of State Dean Rusk, "Political and 
Military Aspects of U.S. Policy in Vietnam," Pentagon 
Papers, Vol.IV, Gravel Edition (Boston: Beacon Press,
1972), 636.
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In the sixteenth paragraph Johnson asks, "Why are we in 
South Vietnam?” He then answers: "We are there because 
we have a promise to keep. Since 1954 every American 
President has offered support to the people of South 
Vietnam." However, before any mention of the prudential 
costs of not keeping promises— the subject which dominat­
ed discussions in the internal realm— Johnson posited the 
Kantian imperative that "to dishonor that pledge, to 
abandon this small and brave nation to its enemies, and 
to the terror that must follow would be an unforgivable 
wrong." Immediately following this moral argument for 
escalation, Johnson gave the secondary argument, which in 
the internal realm was preeminent. "We are also there to 
strengthen world order. Around the globe, from Berlin to 
Thailand, are people whose well-being rests in part on 
the belief that they can count on us if they are at­
tacked .1,24
24Johnson, "Text of Address." (emphasis added) The 
divergence between internal and external justifications 
in this case appears to be less than in some of the other
cases we have looked at. Because of the subtle and 
qualitative nature of this "divergence of order" one 
might assume there was no divergence. In this case the 
illusion is perpetuated by analysts who comment and 
record with only limited information. A demonstration of 
the fact that analysts often neglect the first quarter of 
Johnson's speech is evidenced by the fact that in most 
accounts only the "domino theory" and passages about "the 
appetite of aggression is never satisfied" get signifi­
cant attention. The editors of the Pentagon Papers
deleted the first 12 paragraphs of Johnson's speech. See
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Following the President's speech, leading admini­
stration policy-makers made specific reference to the 
order of reasons for U.S. intervention. Inevitably 
government spokesmen emphasized legal and moral commit­
ments in the external realm and only referred to credibi­
lity or world order as they related to "secondary objec­
tives” of U.S. policy.25 The administration structured 
its external justification in a manner designed to in­
fluence specific audiences.
The administration's concern with the reaction of 
states in the international community to U.S. policy in 
Vietnam is reflected more in the actions chosen by the 
United States— since actions would be understood as 
specific signals— rather than in the justification that 
accompanied those actions. However, there were instances 
where U.S. actions were supplemented with statements 
specifically designed to encourage support for the United
"Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia," Pentagon Papers, 
Vol.Ill, Gravel Edition, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1972), 
730-731.
“Specific citations of the administration's inverted 
priorities can be found in most official statements from 
1964-1966. See Department of State Bulletin form the 
period. For edited versions of major public pronounce­
ments by principals other than the President and the 
Secretary of State see the Pentagon Papers, Vol.Ill, 707- 
743 and Vol.IV, 626-682 in sections entitled "Justific­
ation of the War— Public Statements."
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States in the international community. In an attempt to 
dispel charges alleging the U.S. was unwilling to negoti­
ate a peace settlement, Johnson halted the air raids on 
the north in the much publicized "bombing pause." The 
pause was accompanied by a series of points which out­
lined an American negotiating position. A number of 
analysts as well as participants have suggested that the 
public statements provided by the administration did not 
accurately represent the intentions of the U.S. govern­
ment, but were designed to disarm international critics 
before the planned escalation of the air war against the 
North. In a memorandum to President Johnson, McNamara 
suggested the United States should publicly call for 
negotiations in order "to cement the support for U.S. 
policy by the U.S. public, allies and friends, and to 
keep international opposition to a manageable level." 
McNamara recognized the initiatives would be rebuffed by 
North Vietnam but argued "they nevertheless should be 
made." This would put the U.S. in a more favorable 
position when hostilities resumed.26
26As cited in Kahin, 329-331, 355-356. For a discus­
sion of the international propaganda motives behind the 
administration's external justification see Herring, 134- 
135; and Valenti, 221-227.
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The American public was an important audience for 
the Johnson administration and, to some degree, the need 
for support among the American people conditioned the 
divergence of order. As suggested in Chapter One, exter­
nal justifications tend to stress moral, ideological, and 
legal reasons for policy rather than reasons of national 
interest. By invoking these types of arguments it was 
thought the general public would be more likely to sup­
port the policies of the administration. The external 
justification did explain policy to a great degree using 
moral and ideological themes. These justifications 
became increasingly unacceptable to the American public 
as the war progressed. Television coverage of the "moral 
crusade" praised by the administration left many 
Americans doubting whether the war was not immoral. 
Johnson launched a public relations campaign to gain 
support for his policies. In fact, in just four and a 
half years the President himself addressed the United 
States public over 200 times on the subject of Vietnam.27 
However, while the external justification was meant to 
lend legitimacy to and gain public support for U.S. 
policy, the length of the war and the extensive media 
coverage it received eroded widespread public support.
27Turner, 1.
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Another factor conditioning a divergence of order 
was an accurate belief that the average man could not be 
emotionally moved by esoteric theories of deterrence or 
diatribes about the importance of perceptions in interna­
tional politics. Because of this belief, the primary 
internal arguments became "secondary considerations" in 
the external realm. While some critics attacked the 
intellectual presuppositions of the domino effect, most 
people were simply unmoved by the ethereal arguments of 
cause and effect.28 Just months before the fateful de­
cision of July 1965 which put the U.S. on an irreversible 
course, Vice President Hubert Humphrey warned Johnson, 
"American wars have to be politically understandable by 
the American public. There has to be a cogent, convinc­
ing case if we are to enjoy sustained public support."29
28According to Raymond Cohen, "The language of geo­
politics makes little sense to the general public. 
Abstractions have to be given concrete form so that they 
can be grasped and related to. . . . For the professional 
there is 'nothing personal' in it all. they are simply 
acting, as duty obliges them to, as fiduciary agents of 
the state, just as a lawyer acts dispassionately in the 
best interests of his client. But for the public there 
has to be something personal in the carnage and the 
suffering. Only by personalizing it all, therefore, can 
the community affect the perceptions and actions of its 
members in the directions its interest require." Raymond 
Cohen, Theater of Power (New York: Longman, 1987), 26.
29Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May, Thinking in 
Time: The Uses of History for Decision-Makers (New York: 
The Free Press, 1986), 87.
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Humphrey understood the importance of a comprehensible 
and acceptable external justification in a country like 
the United States. In World War II the American people 
perceived the United States as rescuing the free world 
from an evil aggressor. Moreover, deep cultural, his­
torical and economic ties existed between Western Europe 
and the United States and there was an unambiguous enemy 
in Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan. The Vietnam conflict 
and the justifications for American policy were much more 
subtle than in 1942. Vietnam was not a "war to end all 
wars."30 After the moral and legal justifications had been 
questioned, the administration lacked a clear and easily 
understandable justification for its policies. The 
secondary considerations expressed in the external jus­
tification could not motivate Americans to make the 
sacrifices they did in 1942-1945 when things seemed much 
clearer.31
30Turner suggests that the lack of a comprehensible 
and acceptable justification for America's involvement in 
Vietnam led to a decrease in public support. According 
to Turner, the Tet offensive of 1968 exposed the admini­
stration to questions that were not answered in a manner 
that could sustain the support of the public. Turner, 
234-238.
31George Kennan views with distaste the American 
penchant "to attribute a universal significance to de­
cisions we have already found it necessary, for limited 
and parochial reasons, to take. It was not enough for 
us, when circumstances forced us into World War I, to 
hold in view the specific reasons for our entry: our war
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effort had to be clothed in the form of an effort to make 
the world (nothing less) 'safe for democracy.' It was 
not enough for us, in World War II, that the Japanese 
attacked us at Pearl Harbor and that both Japanese and 
German governments declared war on us: we did not feel 
comfortable until we had wrapped our military effort in 
the wholly universalistic— and largely meaningless—  
generalities of the Atlantic Charter." Kennan, 322-323. 
For a condensed version of the internal and external 
justifications of the decision to commit ground combat 
troops in Vietnam, see table in Appendix B.
CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSION
94
The examination of the Greek-Turkish question and 
the U.S. entry into Vietnam have hopefully clarified the 
internal-external paradigm and elaborated the role of 
justification in the policy process. A brief summary of 
the categories used in this model and some of their 
implications for future research is in order.
In the foreign policy process justifications often 
change as the audience changes. External justifications 
are usually directed toward the press, the public, and 
specific segments of the international community; for 
this reason, they frequently contain moral, legal and 
ideological arguments to a greater extent than internal 
justifications. Internal justifications are harder to 
pinpoint because of the ambiguity of their form and their 
inaccessibility in the public domain. Observers of 
international relations are likely to disagree on what 
elements of the policy debate comprise the internal 
justification and which are the most significant in 
shaping the policy. Internal justifications frequently 
stress arguments based on the "national interest," employ 
subtle definitions of power, and are presented in an
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arcane language that is incomprehensible to a wider 
audience.l
This examination of justification offered detailed 
examination of two causes of divergence. First, the 
Greek-Turkish aid policy demonstrated a divergence condi­
tioned by a need to gain domestic political support for 
the Truman administration's foreign policy. Second, the 
Vietnam policy of the Johnson administration demonstrated 
a divergence caused, in large part, by a perceived need 
to signal international friends and foes of the credibi­
lity of the American commitment to its allies. Another 
factor that might induce a divergence between internal 
and external justifications is the need to maintain 
ideological consistency. A number of specialists on 
Soviet foreign policy have indicated a divergence exists 
between the external rhetoric involving "socialist bro-
2While the arcane language and rationale of 
Johnson's advisors was noted, a better example of an 
issue area where all but specialists are excluded from 
the policy debate is that of strategic nuclear doctrine. 
Intricate deterrence theories are not accessible to a 
large audience. For more detail on the exclusive lan­
guage of nuclear deterrence see Carol Cohn, "Nuclear 
Language and How we Learned to Pat the Bomb," Bulletin of 
Atomic Scientists (June 1988), 17-24; and Michael Tier­
ney, "The Language of Deterrence," The College of William 
and Mary, 1986
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therhood" and "commitment to world revolution" and the 
extremely pragmatic policies practiced by the Soviets.2
The types of divergence spelled out in the preceding 
pages were of two types. The simple divergence, repre­
sented by the Greek-Turkish aid policy, had internal and 
external justifications with different arguments con­
tained in each. The qualitative divergence or divergence 
of order, which appeared during the debate over the 
American role in Vietnam, allowed for similar material in 
the two realms but the presentation of the material was 
such that a divergence did exist. It is difficult to 
compare the two types of divergence in a quantitative or 
graphical sense, but one suspects that the gap between 
internal and external justifications would probably be 
greater in the case of a simple divergence.
While the internal-external model employs an artifi­
cial taxonomy which often simplifies aspects of the 
decision-making process, its categories are nevertheless
2Soviet policy in China in 1927, Spain in the late 
1930's, and the ultimate abandonment of ideology in 1939 
represented by the Soviet pact with fascist Germany 
indicate a divergence probably existed. However, since 
very few people are privy to the justifications offered 
in the Kremlin, the' internal-external scheme is probably 
not well suited to examine these questions. American 
Cold War rhetoric might offer good opportunities for an 
examination of the role of ideology as a cause of diver­
gence .
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useful as analytical tools. This framework offers sever­
al benefits to the observer of foreign policy decision­
making and international relations. First, it offers a 
system of classificatory terms with which one can uni­
formly define numerous events and cases over a broad 
range of issue areas. It is a theoretical coat rack. 
Second, the distinction between the two realms encourage 
the author and the reader to search for the "real rea­
sons" for a given policy. It also alerts the attentive 
observer that neither the internal nor the external 
justification is necessarily the "real reason." Third, 
after uncovering a number of internal justifications for 
particular policies, one is struck by the nature of power 
as understood by policy makers. The policy makers may be 
wrong about their subtle definitions of power, but to 
determine this one would have to do significantly more 
research. The internal-external model provides a good 
foundation for approaching the question of whether such 
"psychological" elements of power are indeed as signifi­
cant as the participants in the Vietnam case would indi­
cate.3
3It may be the case that Johnson and his advisors 
were correct in their assumption that other countries 
were concerned with the U.S. reaction to a challenge in 
Vietnam. However, this does not necessarily mean the 
administration acted correctly. Even if reputation and 
perceptions are an important variable in the power equa-
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While this study has concentrated on divergence between 
internal and external justifications, it is entirely 
possible for a convergence to exist. However, the evi­
dence of divergence in a large number of policy decisions 
examined prior to the writing of this thesis was strik­
ing. Evidence of divergence existed not only in the case 
studies provided here but in the Berlin crises, the Cuban 
missile crisis, and the Iran-contra affair.
The theoretical skeleton provided here is a prere­
quisite to more significant conclusions about the results 
of a divergence or a convergence for the success, coher­
ence, or acceptability of a policy. What follows from 
the fact that a divergence exists? Crystal clear cor­
relations should not be expected; if they existed, some­
one would have noticed by now. However, if general 
conclusions could be contextualized without getting too 
specific or descriptive, they could be helpful to policy 
makers and political leaders as well as aspiring academi­
cians .
tion, the administration could have (and most would agree 
it did) miscalculated. It is hard to believe the U.S. 
would have suffered more in the long-run by pulling out 
of Vietnam in 1965 despite the damage to its reputation 
as a global power and a good ally.
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Internal Justification
Audience: Professional 
bureaucracy, White House 
Staff, N.S.C., Selected 
diplomats
American interests are 
served through world 
order, spheres of 
influence, and expanding 
world trade.
The U.S. should commit 
funds and support to 
Greece and Turkey because:
The loss of Greece and 
Turkey by default might 
encourage the political 
neutralization of Western 
Europe and political 
instability throughout the 
world.
A failure to commit is a 
green light to similar 
revolutionary movements 
elsewhere.
A failure to commit 
might, in an indirect way, 
lead to the economic 
collapse of Western
Europe .
The program will be a 
forerunner to a wider aid 
program covering all of 
Western Europe.
External Justication
Audience: Congress,
American public
America stands for freedom 
of choice and against 
aggressive forces in the 
world. America is a moral 
leader.
The U.S. should commit 
funds and support to 
Greece and Turkey because:
There is an imminent 
communist military threat 
to Western Europe (as well 
as Greece and Turkey).
It is the moral 
obligation of the United 
States to support 
democratic forces in 
Greece and Turkey (and 
elsewhere in the world if 
need be) against internal 
and external aggression.
There is an ongoing 
global struggle between 
the forces of good and 
evil. This policy puts 
the United States on the 
moral high ground.
Principal Cause of Divergence--> Congressional/domestic 
reluctance to support foreign aid programs.
^Secondary Cause of Divergence— > Signal to the Soviet 
Union that the U.S. ,was getting tough. Signal to 
democratic forces in western Europe that the U.S. would
help them in reconstruction efforts.
Appendix A
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Internal Justification
Audience: N.S.C., former
policy makers, selected 
Congressional leaders
Belief among policy makers 
that an attentive interna­
tional audience viewed the 
American response in Viet­
nam as a test case for fu­
ture security crises.
Reasons U.S. should commit 
ground combat forces to 
Vietnam (listed in order 
of importance):
1. To maintain American 
credibility as a nation 
which keeps its promises.
2. To maintain the inde­
pendence of Vietnam.
While South Vietnam in it­
self had little strategic 
or economic value for the 
U.S., South East Asia was 
of considerable import­
ance .
3. To improve the freedom 
and maintain the integrity 
of the people of South 
Vietnam who have little 
tradition of democracy but 
nevertheless must want it.
External Justification
Audience:American allies 
throughout the world, So­
viet Union, China, nation­
alist movements in the 
third world, American Pub­
lic
The United States should 
support those forces in 
the world fighting for 
freedom. American stead­
fastness in this case will 
serve that goal in the fu­
ture .
Reasons U.S. should commit 
ground combat forces to 
Vietnam (listed in order 
of importance):
1. To aid the people of 
South Vietnam who are val­
iantly struggling to es­
tablish democratic in­
stitutions in the face of 
aggression from the com­
munist north.
2. To maintain the in­
dependence of the Republic 
of Vietnam, which is the 
"keystone" in the dike 
containing communism in 
South East Asia.
3. To maintain 
credibility.
^Principal Cause of Divergence of Order:— >The importance 
of credibility and power politics in the internal realm 
was "unsavory," and certainly nothing one could wave the 
flag about.
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